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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 09:01:44 +0100
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
To: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc: nhorman@...driver.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V5 09/10] audit: add support for containerid to
network namespaces
On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 2:12 AM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 2019-03-27 23:42, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:35 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task
> > > context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing
> > > rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network
> > > namespace could be in use by multiple containers by association to the
> > > tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute
> > > these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network
> > > namespace to track these audit container identifiiers.
> > >
> > > Add/increment the audit container identifier on:
> > > - initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc
> > > - clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier
> > > - unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier
> > > - setns call that inherits an audit container identifier
> > > Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on:
> > > - an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set
> > > - process exit
> > > - unshare call that drops a net namespace
> > > - setns call that drops a net namespace
> > >
> > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92
> > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/audit.h | 19 ++++++++++++
> > > kernel/audit.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > > kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++
> > > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > > index fa19fa408931..70255c2dfb9f 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> > > #include <linux/namei.h> /* LOOKUP_* */
> > > #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> > > +#include <linux/refcount.h>
> > >
> > > #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
> > > #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1)
> > > @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ struct audit_task_info {
> > >
> > > extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit;
> > >
> > > +struct audit_contid {
> > > + struct list_head list;
> > > + u64 id;
> > > + refcount_t refcount;
> >
> > Hm, since we only ever touch the refcount under a spinlock, I wonder
> > if we could just make it a regular unsigned int (we don't need the
> > atomicity guarantees). OTOH, refcount_t comes with some extra overflow
> > checking, so it's probably better to leave it as is...
>
> Since the update is done using rcu-safe methods, do we even need the
> spin_lock? Neil? Paul?
>
> > > + struct rcu_head rcu;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which);
> > >
> > > extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list);
> > > @@ -202,6 +210,10 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > > }
> > >
> > > extern void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid);
> > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid);
> > > +extern void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid);
> > > +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns,
> > > + struct task_struct *p);
> > >
> > > extern u32 audit_enabled;
> > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > > @@ -271,6 +283,13 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > >
> > > static inline void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid)
> > > { }
> > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid)
> > > +{ }
> > > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid)
> > > +{ }
> > > +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns,
> > > + struct task_struct *p)
> > > +{ }
> > >
> > > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > > index cf448599ef34..7fa3194f5342 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> > > #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
> > > #include <net/netns/generic.h>
> > > +#include <net/net_namespace.h>
> > >
> > > #include "audit.h"
> > >
> > > @@ -99,9 +100,13 @@
> > > /**
> > > * struct audit_net - audit private network namespace data
> > > * @sk: communication socket
> > > + * @contid_list: audit container identifier list
> > > + * @contid_list_lock audit container identifier list lock
> > > */
> > > struct audit_net {
> > > struct sock *sk;
> > > + struct list_head contid_list;
> > > + spinlock_t contid_list_lock;
> > > };
> > >
> > > /**
> > > @@ -275,8 +280,11 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = {
> > > void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > > {
> > > struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit;
> > > + struct nsproxy *ns = tsk->nsproxy;
> > >
> > > audit_free_syscall(tsk);
> > > + if (ns)
> > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, audit_get_contid(tsk));
> > > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after
> > > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid.
> > > */
> > > @@ -376,6 +384,73 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net)
> > > return aunet->sk;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid)
> > > +{
> > > + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > > + struct list_head *contid_list = &aunet->contid_list;
> > > + struct audit_contid *cont;
> > > +
> > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> > > + return;
> > > + if (!aunet)
> > > + return;
> > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock);
> > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list))
> > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list)
> > > + if (cont->id == contid) {
> > > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount);
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > + cont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_contid), GFP_ATOMIC);
> > > + if (cont) {
> > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cont->list);
> > > + cont->id = contid;
> > > + refcount_set(&cont->refcount, 1);
> > > + list_add_rcu(&cont->list, contid_list);
> > > + }
> > > +out:
> > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid)
> > > +{
> > > + struct audit_net *aunet;
> > > + struct list_head *contid_list;
> > > + struct audit_contid *cont = NULL;
> > > +
> > > + if (!net)
> > > + return;
> > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> > > + return;
> > > + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > > + if (!aunet)
> > > + return;
> > > + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list;
> > > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock);
> > > + if (!list_empty(contid_list))
> > > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list)
> > > + if (cont->id == contid) {
> > > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) {
> > > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list);
> > > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu);
> > > + }
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p)
> > > +{
> > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(p);
> > > + struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy;
> > > +
> > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> > > + return;
> > > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, contid);
> > > + if (new)
> > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > void audit_panic(const char *message)
> > > {
> > > switch (audit_failure) {
> > > @@ -1619,7 +1694,6 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
> > > .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
> > > .groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX,
> > > };
> > > -
> > > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id);
> > >
> > > aunet->sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_AUDIT, &cfg);
> > > @@ -1628,7 +1702,8 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net)
> > > return -ENOMEM;
> > > }
> > > aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
> > > -
> > > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aunet->contid_list);
> > > + spin_lock_init(&aunet->contid_list_lock);
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -2380,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> > > uid_t uid;
> > > struct tty_struct *tty;
> > > char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> > > + struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns;
> > >
> > > task_lock(task);
> > > /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> > > @@ -2401,8 +2477,12 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> > > else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> > > rc = -EALREADY;
> > > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> > > - if (!rc)
> > > + if (!rc) {
> > > + if (audit_contid_valid(oldcontid))
> > > + audit_netns_contid_del(net, oldcontid);
> > > task->audit->contid = contid;
> > > + audit_netns_contid_add(net, contid);
> > > + }
> > > task_unlock(task);
> > >
> > > if (!audit_enabled)
> > > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > > index f6c5d330059a..718b1201ae70 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> > > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > > #include <linux/cgroup.h>
> > > #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> > > +#include <linux/audit.h>
> > >
> > > static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;
> > >
> > > @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
> > > struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
> > > struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
> > > struct nsproxy *new_ns;
> > > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(tsk);
> > >
> > > if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
> > > CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
> > > @@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
> > > return PTR_ERR(new_ns);
> > >
> > > tsk->nsproxy = new_ns;
> > > + audit_netns_contid_add(new_ns->net_ns, contid);
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new)
> > > ns = p->nsproxy;
> > > p->nsproxy = new;
> > > task_unlock(p);
> > > + audit_switch_task_namespaces(ns, p);
> >
> > Since we call audit_switch_task_namespaces() after task_unlock(),
> > could there be a potential race condition? I'm not going to dive too
> > much into this now, because it's getting late here, but on first look
> > it seems like p->nsproxy could change under our hands before we fetch
> > it in audit_switch_task_namespaces()...
>
> The rules are defined in include/linux/nsproxy.h.
>
> Since the callers (sys_setns, do_exit, copy_process error path) are all
> current or handing it a dead task and we are not writing nsproxy or its
> pointers, which is only allowed by current anyway, we don't need the
> lock.
I see, so the task lock is taken during the swap only to protect
against races with other tasks reading this task's nsproxy... makes
sense. Thanks for clarifying!
The refcount/spinlock issue is not blocking (and could be addressed in
a follow-up patch later), so:
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
>
> > >
> > > if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count))
> > > free_nsproxy(ns);
> > > --
> > > 1.8.3.1
> >
> > Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
>
> - RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
> Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
> IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
> Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.
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