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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=XiNEhWiswHUschD2dma9SfS+eLRU8gXVJnbo7AozomPg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2019 18:35:40 +0100
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+86b5c7c236a22616a72f@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com>,
Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Subject: Re: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in sctp_getsockopt (3)
On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 3:51 PM Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 09:25:06AM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > syzbot found the following crash on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: c10a026b kmsan: use __free_pages() in kmsan_iounmap_page_r..
> > git tree: kmsan
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=107d3c7d200000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a5675814e8eae69e
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=86b5c7c236a22616a72f
> > compiler: clang version 8.0.0 (trunk 350509)
> > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1252834d200000
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+86b5c7c236a22616a72f@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): veth1_to_hsr: link becomes ready
> > IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): hsr_slave_1: link becomes ready
> > 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> > 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
> > CPU: 0 PID: 10131 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #16
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> > Google 01/01/2011
> > Call Trace:
> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> > dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> > kmsan_report+0x131/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:636
> > kmsan_internal_check_memory+0xaa1/0xbb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:730
> > kmsan_copy_to_user+0xab/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:485
> > _copy_to_user+0x16b/0x1f0 lib/usercopy.c:32
> > copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:174 [inline]
> > sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5911 [inline]
> > sctp_getsockopt+0x1668e/0x17f70 net/sctp/socket.c:7562
> > sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2950
> > __sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1938
> > __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1949 [inline]
> > __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1946
> > __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1946
> > do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
> > RIP: 0033:0x458209
> > Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
> > 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff
> > 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> > RSP: 002b:00007fdbef191c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
> > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000458209
> > RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: 0000000000000084 RDI: 0000000000000004
> > RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000000000000
> > R10: 0000000020000280 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdbef1926d4
> > R13: 00000000004c96c8 R14: 00000000004d0310 R15: 00000000ffffffff
> >
> > Uninit was stored to memory at:
> > kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:205 [inline]
> > kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:220 [inline]
> > kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:426
> > kmsan_memcpy_memmove_metadata+0xb5b/0xfe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:304
> > kmsan_memcpy_metadata+0xb/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:324
> > __msan_memcpy+0x58/0x70 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:139
> > sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs net/sctp/socket.c:5906 [inline]
> > sctp_getsockopt+0x16556/0x17f70 net/sctp/socket.c:7562
> > sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:2950
> > __sys_getsockopt+0x489/0x550 net/socket.c:1938
> > __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:1949 [inline]
> > __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:1946
> > __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:1946
> > do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
> >
> > Uninit was stored to memory at:
> > kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:205 [inline]
> > kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:220 [inline]
> > kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x134/0x230 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:426
> > kmsan_memcpy_memmove_metadata+0xb5b/0xfe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:304
> > kmsan_memcpy_metadata+0xb/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:324
> > __msan_memcpy+0x58/0x70 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:139
> > sctp_transport_init net/sctp/transport.c:61 [inline]
> > sctp_transport_new+0x16d/0x9a0 net/sctp/transport.c:115
> > sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x532/0x1f70 net/sctp/associola.c:637
> > sctp_process_param net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2548 [inline]
> > sctp_process_init+0x1a1b/0x3ed0 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2361
> > sctp_cmd_process_init net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:682 [inline]
> > sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1410 [inline]
> > sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1220 [inline]
> > sctp_do_sm+0x3cfc/0x9af0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1191
> > sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x65a/0xd80 net/sctp/associola.c:1074
> > sctp_inq_push+0x300/0x420 net/sctp/inqueue.c:95
> > sctp_backlog_rcv+0x20a/0xaf0 net/sctp/input.c:354
> > sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:936 [inline]
> > __release_sock+0x281/0x5f0 net/core/sock.c:2284
> > release_sock+0x99/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2800
> > sctp_wait_for_connect+0x3ee/0x860 net/sctp/socket.c:8751
> > sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x2167/0x21a0 net/sctp/socket.c:1967
> > sctp_sendmsg+0x3fd7/0x6700 net/sctp/socket.c:2113
> > inet_sendmsg+0x54a/0x720 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:798
> > sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline]
> > sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline]
> > ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2115
> > __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2153 [inline]
> > __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
> > __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2160
> > __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2160
> > do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
> >
> > Local variable description: ----addr.i@...p_process_init
> > Variable was created at:
> > sctp_process_init+0xb5/0x3ed0 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2324
> > sctp_cmd_process_init net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:682 [inline]
> > sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1410 [inline]
> > sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1220 [inline]
> > sctp_do_sm+0x3cfc/0x9af0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1191
> >
> > Bytes 8-15 of 16 are uninitialized
> > Memory access of size 16 starts at ffff88809511fc28
> > Data copied to user address 0000000020000298
> > ==================================================================
> >
> >
> > ---
> > This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@...glegroups.com.
> >
> > syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
> > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
> > syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
> > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches
> >
> >
>
>
> Hmm, odd. I see where we are doing the copy_to_user call in
> getsockopt_peer_addrs, but the length we copy should always be equal to or less
> than what was memcopied to the temp variable. False positive?
I'll take a closer look next week.
The bug is reproducible with the following syzkaller program:
r0 = socket$inet(0x2, 0x80001, 0x84)
bind$inet(r0, &(0x7f0000000080)={0x2, 0x4e20, @empty}, 0x10)
sendmsg(r0, &(0x7f0000000100)={&(0x7f0000006000)=@...{0x2, 0x4e20,
@loopback}, 0x80, &(0x7f0000007f80)=[{&(0x7f00000001c0)="de", 0x1}],
0x1}, 0x0)
getsockopt$inet_sctp_SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDRS(r0, 0x84, 0x6c,
&(0x7f0000000000)={<r5=>0x0, 0x38,
"41925f90e4121fadc9c1296dd22ae19d0b1b0942e46fc79e2ecec1056b23199f0ca008915d8dba1b3896c154f2244bbe859fe3423a4b437a"},
&(0x7f0000000040)=0x40)
Just need to check where the uninitializedness comes from.
> Neil
>
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
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