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Date:   Sat, 30 Mar 2019 12:20:20 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] x86/kvm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>

Using static_cpu_has() is pointless on those paths, convert them to the
boot_cpu_has() variant.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  4 ++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b5b128a0a051..ecc6aba37b8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static void svm_init_erratum_383(void)
 	int err;
 	u64 val;
 
-	if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH))
 		return;
 
 	/* Use _safe variants to not break nested virtualization */
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
 static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
 {
 	/* Make sure we clean up behind us */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
 
 	cpu_svm_disable();
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
 
 	wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, page_to_pfn(sd->save_area) << PAGE_SHIFT);
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
 		__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
 	}
@@ -2252,7 +2252,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	for (i = 0; i < NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS; i++)
 		rdmsrl(host_save_user_msrs[i], svm->host_user_msrs[i]);
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
 		u64 tsc_ratio = vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio;
 		if (tsc_ratio != __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio)) {
 			__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, tsc_ratio);
@@ -2260,7 +2260,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 		}
 	}
 	/* This assumes that the kernel never uses MSR_TSC_AUX */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
 
 	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index c73375e01ab8..0cb0d26564ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6423,7 +6423,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
 		vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
 	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
 	    vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
 		__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
@@ -6512,7 +6512,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
 	 * XSAVE.
 	 */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
 	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
 		vcpu->arch.pkru = __read_pkru();
 		if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
-- 
2.21.0

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