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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 08:55:36 -0400
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc: containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, nhorman@...driver.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V5 05/10] audit: add containerid support for
ptrace and signals
On 2019-03-27 22:04, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2019-03-27 22:17, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In
> > > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record
> > > to which it is associated.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
> > > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
> > > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++
> > > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
> > > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info {
> > > uid_t uid;
> > > pid_t pid;
> > > char ctx[0];
> > > + u64 cid;
> > > };
> >
> > It seems like this structure implicitly defines the format of some
> > message that is sent to userspace... If so, how will userspace detect
> > that a new format (including the cid) is being used? Even assuming the
> > fixed order as pointed out by Neil, the message still seems to be
> > variable-sized so userspace cannot even use the length to infer that.
> > Am I missing something here? (I hope I am :)
>
> How humble of you again. No, you're not missing something. This ends
> up being an api change... That can be fixed in userspace by checking
> for AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID, but how do we make a newer kernel
> not break an older userspace... I think this was the original rationale
> for adding it after the ctx but totally missing the fact that the latter
> is a variable-length field.
The way to address this on Steve Grubb's advice is to create a new
message type that incorporates a new struct with the structure above,
leaving the old one with the old message type deprecated. I've coded
this up along with userspace support.
> This patch really should be split into audit_sig_cid changes in a patch
> by itself and target_cid changes which could go with the second and
> fourth patches.
I've also done this which Paul had already asked for, not quite in this
form.
I believe this addresses all the outstanding issues.
> > > struct audit_buffer;
> > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net {
> > > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
> > > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
> > > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
> > > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> > >
> > > /* Records can be lost in several ways:
> > > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
> > > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> > > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> > > security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> > > }
> > > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid;
> > > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
> > > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> > > kfree(sig_data);
> > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> > > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/audit.h
> > > +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> > > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> > > kuid_t target_uid;
> > > unsigned int target_sessionid;
> > > u32 target_sid;
> > > + u64 target_cid;
> > > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
> > >
> > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
> > > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
> > > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
> > > extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
> > > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid;
> > >
> > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
> > >
> > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> > > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
> > > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> > > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> > > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> > > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
> > > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
> > > int pid_count;
> > > };
> > > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
> > > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
> > > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
> > >
> > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
> > > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) {
> > > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
> > > axs->target_auid[i],
> > > axs->target_uid[i],
> > > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
> > > axs->target_sid[i],
> > > axs->target_comm[i]))
> > > call_panic = 1;
> > > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]);
> > > + }
> > > }
> > >
> > > - if (context->target_pid &&
> > > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> > > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
> > > - context->target_sessionid,
> > > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
> > > + if (context->target_pid) {
> > > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
> > > + context->target_auid,
> > > + context->target_uid,
> > > + context->target_sessionid,
> > > + context->target_sid,
> > > + context->target_comm))
> > > call_panic = 1;
> > > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid);
> > > + }
> > >
> > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
> > > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
> > > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> > > context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
> > > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> > > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> > > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t);
> > > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> > > else
> > > audit_sig_uid = uid;
> > > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> > > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current);
> > > }
> > >
> > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> > > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> > > ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
> > > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> > > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> > > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t);
> > > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> > > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
> > > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> > > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> > > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t);
> > > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> > > axp->pid_count++;
> > >
> >
> > Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
>
> - RGB
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
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