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Message-ID: <20190330163854.t67m2h6m3hmshqtg@brauner.io>
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 17:38:55 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@...il.com>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Nagarathnam Muthusamy <nagarathnam.muthusamy@...cle.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] pid: add pidfd_open()
On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 09:34:02AM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 9:24 AM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Mar 30, 2019 at 9:19 AM Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io> wrote:
> > >
> > > From pure API perspective that's all I care about: independence of procfs.
> > > Once we have pidfd_open() we can cleanly signal threads etc.
> >
> > But "independence from procfs" means that you damn well don't then do
> > "oh, now I have a pidfd, I want to turn it into a /proc fd and then
> > munge around there".
> >
> > So I'm literally saying that it had better really *be* independent
> > from /proc. It is the standalone version, but it's most definitely
> > also the version that doesn't then give you secret access to /proc.
>
> Just to be clear, I'm not proposing granting secret access to procfs,
> and as far as I can see, nobody else is either. We've been talking
> about making it easier to avoid races when you happen to want a pidfd
> and a procfs fd that point to the same process, not granting access
> that you didn't have before. If you'd rather not connect procfs and
> pidfds, we can take this functionality off the table.
This is dead! Nothing like this will make it through this tree. I have
no intention of endangering pidfd_send_signal().
Christian
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