[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <d117fb1a-45e4-a553-082e-36112dfbbf8a@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 17:14:20 +0300
From: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@...e.com>
To: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@...e.de>,
Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux FSDEVEL Mailinglist <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs
On 1.04.19 г. 12:01 ч., Johannes Thumshirn wrote:
> Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not
> thousands of security vulnerabilities.
>
> One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes
> called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then
> abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using
> memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
>
> Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so
> I've decided to put an end to it.
>
> If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM
> indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux
> anymore.
>
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@...e.de>
Ack-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@...e.com>
> ---
> fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
> struct open_flags op;
> int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
> struct filename *tmp;
> + char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
> + int i;
> + static const char * const list[] = {
> + "syzkaller",
> + "syz-executor,"
> + "trinity",
> + NULL
> + };
> +
> + get_task_comm(comm, current);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)
> + if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))
> + return -EPERM;
>
> if (fd)
> return fd;
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists