linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 037/134] powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit)

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Date:   Mon,  1 Apr 2019 19:01:13 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@....com>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 037/134] powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit)

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@....com>

commit 10c5e83afd4a3f01712d97d3bb1ae34d5b74a185 upstream.

In order to protect against speculation attacks on
indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at
kernel entry to protect for the following situations:
- userspace process attacking another userspace process
- userspace process attacking the kernel
Basically when the privillege level change (i.e. the
kernel is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@....com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S       |    5 +++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_low_64e.S        |    7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_TM)
 	std	r0,GPR0(r1)
 	std	r10,GPR1(r1)
 	beq	2f			/* if from kernel mode */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
+START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+	BTB_FLUSH(r10)
+END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+#endif
 	ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_ENTRY(r13, r10, r11)
 2:	std	r2,GPR2(r1)
 	std	r3,GPR3(r1)
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S
@@ -296,7 +296,8 @@ ret_from_mc_except:
 	andi.	r10,r11,MSR_PR;		/* save stack pointer */	    \
 	beq	1f;			/* branch around if supervisor */   \
 	ld	r1,PACAKSAVE(r13);	/* get kernel stack coming from usr */\
-1:	cmpdi	cr1,r1,0;		/* check if SP makes sense */	    \
+1:	type##_BTB_FLUSH		\
+	cmpdi	cr1,r1,0;		/* check if SP makes sense */	    \
 	bge-	cr1,exc_##n##_bad_stack;/* bad stack (TODO: out of line) */ \
 	mfspr	r10,SPRN_##type##_SRR0;	/* read SRR0 before touching stack */
 
@@ -328,6 +329,29 @@ ret_from_mc_except:
 #define SPRN_MC_SRR0	SPRN_MCSRR0
 #define SPRN_MC_SRR1	SPRN_MCSRR1
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
+#define GEN_BTB_FLUSH			\
+	START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION		\
+		beq 1f;			\
+		BTB_FLUSH(r10)			\
+		1:		\
+	END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+
+#define CRIT_BTB_FLUSH			\
+	START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION		\
+		BTB_FLUSH(r10)		\
+	END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+
+#define DBG_BTB_FLUSH CRIT_BTB_FLUSH
+#define MC_BTB_FLUSH CRIT_BTB_FLUSH
+#define GDBELL_BTB_FLUSH GEN_BTB_FLUSH
+#else
+#define GEN_BTB_FLUSH
+#define CRIT_BTB_FLUSH
+#define DBG_BTB_FLUSH
+#define GDBELL_BTB_FLUSH
+#endif
+
 #define NORMAL_EXCEPTION_PROLOG(n, intnum, addition)			    \
 	EXCEPTION_PROLOG(n, intnum, GEN, addition##_GEN(n))
 
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_low_64e.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_low_64e.S
@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
 	std	r15,EX_TLB_R15(r12)
 	std	r10,EX_TLB_CR(r12)
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
+START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
+	mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
+	andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
+	beq 1f
+	BTB_FLUSH(r10)
+1:
+END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
 	std	r7,EX_TLB_R7(r12)
 #endif
 	TLB_MISS_PROLOG_STATS