[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <lsq.1554212307.974657518@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:38:27 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
"Takashi Iwai" <tiwai@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 31/99] ALSA: pcm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
3.16.65-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
commit 94ffb030b6d31ec840bb811be455dd2e26a4f43e upstream.
stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/core/pcm.c:140 snd_pcm_control_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pcm->streams' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing stream before using it to index pcm->streams
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
sound/core/pcm.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/core/pcm.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <sound/core.h>
#include <sound/minors.h>
#include <sound/pcm.h>
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_control_ioctl(struct
return -EFAULT;
if (stream < 0 || stream > 1)
return -EINVAL;
+ stream = array_index_nospec(stream, 2);
if (get_user(subdevice, &info->subdevice))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
Powered by blists - more mailing lists