linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for SME early boot code

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Message-ID: <20190408190800.GL15689@zn.tnic>
Date:   Mon, 8 Apr 2019 21:08:00 +0200
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Gary R Hook <ghook@....com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Hook, Gary" <Gary.Hook@....com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for SME
 early boot code

On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 06:41:30PM +0000, Gary R Hook wrote:
> Again, not arguing. I completely understand. However, to be fair, this 
> isn't about SME having trouble with those facilities, this is about 
> using certain features (e.g. command line option processing) early in 
> the boot. Any complex feature could have had that requirement, don't you 
> think?

Sure, but then why do we need that patch at all then? Why do we need to
disable instrumentation for SME early code and not for other early code?

I mean, if you grep around the tree you can see a bunch of
KASAN_SANITIZE but in lib/ we only have

lib/Makefile:210:KASAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n

which is special. But the rest of the generic code in lib/ or
arch/x86/lib/ isn't.

Now, there's this:

arch/x86/boot/Makefile:12:KASAN_SANITIZE                        := n
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile:20:KASAN_SANITIZE                     := n

which disables KASAN for all boot code.

And this is what you mean - all early boot code should not be sanitized.

Which also gives the right solution, IMO:

cmdline.o should not be sanitized only when used in the boot code. But
that is already the case.

So why do you need to disable KASAN for arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c?

Because for those two:

arch/x86/boot/cmdline.c
arch/x86/boot/compressed/cmdline.c

that should already be the case due to the Makefile defines above.

> Right. My goal was to get a conversation started, because folks are
> running into this problem when KASAN is enabled.

You say KASAN. Why is there KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o too?

> N.B. Here's another facet of this problem: cmdline.c doesn't (today) 
> contain anything that would trigger the stack protector. However, it's 
> possible to enable the stack protector globally when building, right? In 
> which case, a boot would fail, so we have the same issue: early boot 
> code has special requirements / restrictions.

How so?

This .config boots here in a vm just fine.

$ grep STACKPROT .config
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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