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Message-ID: <20190409084031.GO4038@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:40:31 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: mm: Do not use set_{pud,pmd}_safe when splitting
the large page
On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 07:11:21PM +0000, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
> The following commit 0a9fe8ca844d ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init()
> PTE population") triggers the below warning in the SEV guest.
>
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h:87 phys_pmd_init+0x30d/0x386
> Call Trace:
> kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xce/0x259
> early_set_memory_enc_dec+0x10f/0x160
> kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x71/0x9d
> start_kernel+0x1c9/0x50b
> secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
>
> The SEV guest calls kernel_physical_mapping_init() to clear the encryption
> mask from an existing mapping. While clearing the encryption mask
> kernel_physical_mapping_init() splits the large pages into the smaller.
> To split the page, the kernel_physical_mapping_init() allocates a new page
> and updates the existing entry. The set_{pud,pmd}_safe triggers warning
> when updating the entry with page in the present state. We should use the
> set_{pud,pmd} when updating an existing entry with the new entry.
>
> Updating an entry will also requires a TLB flush. Currently the caller
> (early_set_memory_enc_dec()) is taking care of issuing the TLB flushes.
I'm not entirely sure I like this, this means all users of
kernel_physical_mapping_init() now need to be aware and careful.
That said; the alternative is adding an argument to the function and
propagating it through the callchain and dynamically switching between
_safe and not. Which doesn't sound ideal either.
Anybody else got clever ideas?
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> Fixes: 0a9fe8ca844d (x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() ...)
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> index bccff68e3267..0a26b64a99b9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ phys_pmd_init(pmd_t *pmd_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
> paddr_last = phys_pte_init(pte, paddr, paddr_end, new_prot);
>
> spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> - pmd_populate_kernel_safe(&init_mm, pmd, pte);
> + pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, pte);
> spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> }
> update_page_count(PG_LEVEL_2M, pages);
> @@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ phys_pud_init(pud_t *pud_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
> page_size_mask, prot);
>
> spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> - pud_populate_safe(&init_mm, pud, pmd);
> + pud_populate(&init_mm, pud, pmd);
> spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
> }
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
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