linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/2] module: Prepare for addition of new ro_after

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Message-Id: <20190410011418.76408-1-joel@joelfernandes.org>
Date:   Tue,  9 Apr 2019 21:14:17 -0400
From:   "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@...lfernandes.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
        paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, rostedt@...dmis.org,
        mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com, rcu@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        keescook@...omium.org, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] module: Prepare for addition of new ro_after_init sections

For the purposes of hardening modules by adding sections to
ro_after_init sections, prepare for addition of new ro_after_init
entries which we do in future patches. Create a table to which new
entries could be added later. This makes it less error prone and reduce
code duplication.

Cc: paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: rostedt@...dmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com
Cc: rcu@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: kernel-team@...roid.com
Suggested-by: keescook@...omium.org
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@...lfernandes.org>

---
 kernel/module.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 524da609c884..f9221381d076 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3300,11 +3300,28 @@ static bool blacklisted(const char *module_name)
 }
 core_param(module_blacklist, module_blacklist, charp, 0400);
 
+/*
+ * Mark ro_after_init section with SHF_RO_AFTER_INIT so that
+ * layout_sections() can put it in the right place.
+ * Note: ro_after_init sections also have SHF_{WRITE,ALLOC} set.
+ */
+static char *ro_after_init_sections[] = {
+	".data..ro_after_init",
+
+	/*
+	 * __jump_table structures are never modified, with the exception of
+	 * entries that refer to code in the __init section, which are
+	 * annotated as such at module load time.
+	 */
+	"__jump_table",
+	NULL
+};
+
 static struct module *layout_and_allocate(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	struct module *mod;
 	unsigned int ndx;
-	int err;
+	int err, i;
 
 	err = check_modinfo(info->mod, info, flags);
 	if (err)
@@ -3319,23 +3336,12 @@ static struct module *layout_and_allocate(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	/* We will do a special allocation for per-cpu sections later. */
 	info->sechdrs[info->index.pcpu].sh_flags &= ~(unsigned long)SHF_ALLOC;
 
-	/*
-	 * Mark ro_after_init section with SHF_RO_AFTER_INIT so that
-	 * layout_sections() can put it in the right place.
-	 * Note: ro_after_init sections also have SHF_{WRITE,ALLOC} set.
-	 */
-	ndx = find_sec(info, ".data..ro_after_init");
-	if (ndx)
-		info->sechdrs[ndx].sh_flags |= SHF_RO_AFTER_INIT;
-	/*
-	 * Mark the __jump_table section as ro_after_init as well: these data
-	 * structures are never modified, with the exception of entries that
-	 * refer to code in the __init section, which are annotated as such
-	 * at module load time.
-	 */
-	ndx = find_sec(info, "__jump_table");
-	if (ndx)
-		info->sechdrs[ndx].sh_flags |= SHF_RO_AFTER_INIT;
+	/* Set sh_flags for read-only after init sections */
+	for (i = 0; ro_after_init_sections[i]; i++) {
+		ndx = find_sec(info, ro_after_init_sections[i]);
+		if (ndx)
+			info->sechdrs[ndx].sh_flags |= SHF_RO_AFTER_INIT;
+	}
 
 	/* Determine total sizes, and put offsets in sh_entsize.  For now
 	   this is done generically; there doesn't appear to be any
-- 
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog