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Message-Id: <6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
        Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                               |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3ea92e075c64..3e33bd03441a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,15 +2545,20 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2561,12 +2566,13 @@
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 			auto,nosmt
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
 				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2da82eff0eb4..8043a21f36be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1008,6 +1010,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 5d27172c683f..9c2463bc158f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
-- 
2.17.2

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