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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1904160952410.9803@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 09:53:29 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
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Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
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Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
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Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline
option
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> v2:
> - docs improvements: [Randy, Michael]
> - Rename to "mitigations=" [Michael]
> - Add cpu_mitigations_off() function wrapper [Michael]
> - x86: Simplify logic [Boris]
> - powerpc: Fix no_rfi_flush checking bug (use '&&' instead of '||')
> - arm64: Rebase onto Jeremy Linton's v7 patches [Will]
> - arm64: "kpti command line option" [Steve P]
> - arm64: Add nospectre_v2 support
>
> -----------
>
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
>
> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
>
> a) they want all mitigations off;
>
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
> it's vulnerable; or
>
> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
> vulnerable.
>
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
>
> - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
>
> - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
> leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
>
> - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
> SMT if needed by a mitigation.
>
> Josh Poimboeuf (5):
> cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
> x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
> powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
> s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
> arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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