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Message-ID: <tip-d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812@git.kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:02:02 -0700
From: tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf <tipbot@...or.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@...nel.org, luto@...nel.org, jikos@...nel.org,
will.deacon@....com, benh@...nel.crashing.org,
schwidefsky@...ibm.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, hpa@...or.com, mpe@...erman.id.au,
aarcange@...hat.com, longman@...hat.com, jcm@...hat.com,
paulus@...ba.org, catalin.marinas@....com, jpoimboe@...hat.com,
jkosina@...e.cz, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
pauld@...hat.com, rdunlap@...radead.org, tyhicks@...onical.com,
steven.price@....com, heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, bp@...en8.de,
peterz@...radead.org
Subject: [tip:core/speculation] x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations='
cmdline option
Commit-ID: d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812
Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 15:39:29 -0500
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 21:37:28 +0200
x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@....com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 +++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++++--
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 720ffa9c4e04..779ddeb2929c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2514,15 +2514,20 @@
http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
mitigations=
- Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
- This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
- of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
- options.
+ [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+ vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
+ arch-independent options, each of which is an
+ aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
off
Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+ Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+ nospectre_v2 [X86]
+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
+ l1tf=off [X86]
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2530,12 +2535,13 @@
users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
- This is the default behavior.
+ Equivalent to: (default behavior)
auto,nosmt
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
if needed. This is for users who always want to
be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+ Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 01874d54f4fd..435c078c2948 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
- if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off())
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
- if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
} else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -996,6 +998,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 4fee5c3003ed..5890f09bfc19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
}
}
- if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
return;
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