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Message-Id: <20190416.210222.227852741250372994.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 21:02:22 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: gustavo@...eddedor.com
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:57:23 -0500
> arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
> exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>
> net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)
>
> Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Applied and queued up for -stable.
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