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Message-ID: <b2d80348-a3d4-ffcc-d174-0a7a244dae0b@ghiti.fr>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 01:24:32 -0400
From: Alex Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@...ux-mips.org>,
Paul Burton <paul.burton@...s.com>,
James Hogan <jhogan@...nel.org>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...ive.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
linux-mips@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 03/11] arm64: Consider stack randomization for mmap
base only when necessary
On 4/18/19 12:37 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:26 AM Alexandre Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr> wrote:
>> Do not offset mmap base address because of stack randomization if
>> current task does not want randomization.
> Maybe mention that this makes this logic match the existing x86 behavior too?
Ok I will add this in case of a v4.
>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Thanks !
>
> -Kees
>
>> ---
>> arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++++-
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
>> index ed4f9915f2b8..ac89686c4af8 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
>> @@ -65,7 +65,11 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
>> static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
>> {
>> unsigned long gap = rlim_stack->rlim_cur;
>> - unsigned long pad = (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT) + stack_guard_gap;
>> + unsigned long pad = stack_guard_gap;
>> +
>> + /* Account for stack randomization if necessary */
>> + if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
>> + pad += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>
>> /* Values close to RLIM_INFINITY can overflow. */
>> if (gap + pad > gap)
>> --
>> 2.20.1
>>
>
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