linux-kernel - Re: RFC: on adding new CLONE_* flags [WAS Re: [PATCH 0/4] clone: add CLONE

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sat, 20 Apr 2019 08:06:19 -0700
From:   Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>
To:     Kevin Easton <kevin@...rana.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
        "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" <lkml@...ux.net>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
Subject: Re: RFC: on adding new CLONE_* flags [WAS Re: [PATCH 0/4] clone: add CLONE_PIDFD]

On Sat, Apr 20, 2019 at 12:14 AM Kevin Easton <kevin@...rana.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 01:29:23PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:59 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 2019-04-15, Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <lkml@...ux.net> wrote:
> > > > > This patchset makes it possible to retrieve pid file descriptors at
> > > > > process creation time by introducing the new flag CLONE_PIDFD to the
> > > > > clone() system call as previously discussed.
> > > >
> > > > Sorry, for highjacking this thread, but I'm curious on what things to
> > > > consider when introducing new CLONE_* flags.
> > > >
> > > > The reason I'm asking is:
> > > >
> > > > I'm working on implementing plan9-like fs namespaces, where unprivileged
> > > > processes can change their own namespace at will. For that, certain
> > > > traditional unix'ish things have to be disabled, most notably suid.
> > > > As forbidding suid can be helpful in other scenarios, too, I thought
> > > > about making this its own feature. Doing that switch on clone() seems
> > > > a nice place for that, IMHO.
> > >
> > > Just spit-balling -- is no_new_privs not sufficient for this usecase?
> > > Not granting privileges such as setuid during execve(2) is the main
> > > point of that flag.
> > >
> >
> > I would personally *love* it if distros started setting no_new_privs
> > for basically all processes.  And pidfd actually gets us part of the
> > way toward a straightforward way to make sudo and su still work in a
> > no_new_privs world: su could call into a daemon that would spawn the
> > privileged task, and su would get a (read-only!) pidfd back and then
> > wait for the fd and exit.  I suppose that, done naively, this might
> > cause some odd effects with respect to tty handling, but I bet it's
> > solveable.  I suppose it would be nifty if there were a way for a
> > process, by mutual agreement, to reparent itself to an unrelated
> > process.
> >
> > Anyway, clone(2) is an enormous mess.  Surely the right solution here
> > is to have a whole new process creation API that takes a big,
> > extensible struct as an argument, and supports *at least* the full
> > abilities of posix_spawn() and ideally covers all the use cases for
> > fork() + do stuff + exec().  It would be nifty if this API also had a
> > way to say "add no_new_privs and therefore enable extra functionality
> > that doesn't work without no_new_privs".  This functionality would
> > include things like returning a future extra-privileged pidfd that
> > gives ptrace-like access.
> >
> > As basic examples, the improved process creation API should take a
> > list of dup2() operations to perform, fds to remove the O_CLOEXEC flag
> > from, fds to close (or, maybe even better, a list of fds to *not*
> > close), a list of rlimit changes to make, a list of signal changes to
> > make, the ability to set sid, pgrp, uid, gid (as in
> > setresuid/setresgid), the ability to do capset() operations, etc.  The
> > posix_spawn() API, for all that it's rather complicated, covers a
> > bunch of the basics pretty well.
>
> The idea of a system call that takes an infinitely-extendable laundry
> list of operations to perform in kernel space seems quite inelegant, if
> only for the error-reporting reason.
>
> Instead, I suggest that what you'd want is a way to create a new
> embryonic process that has no address space and isn't yet schedulable.
> You then just need other-process-directed variants of all the normal
> setup functions - so pr_openat(pidfd, dirfd, pathname, flags, mode),
> pr_sigaction(pidfd, signum, act, oldact), pr_dup2(pidfd, oldfd, newfd)
> etc.

Providing process-directed versions of these functions would be useful
for a variety of management tasks anyway,

> Then when it's all set up you pr_execve() to kick it off.

Yes. That's the right general approach.