linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support

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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wjmT=uC1=18ZYV1CMfP_FBUEjh9_rabH0g+a0z-L0cgHg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 22 Apr 2019 09:55:47 -0700
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@...ellic.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@...hat.com" <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        "npmccallum@...hat.com" <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support

On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 9:48 AM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote:
>
> Right, and loading a malicious enclave doesn't change those guarantees
> (for other enclaves).  Ergo, restricting which enclaves can execute is
> orthogonal to the security provided by SGX.

But it is absolutely worth noting that TSX made a lot of attacks both
easier to _do_, and also easier to _hide_.

All while being basically completely worthless technology to everybody
except for some silly SAP benchmark.

So it is definitely worth at least discussing the downsides of SGX. If
it ends up being another technology that makes it easier to create
malware, without actually having a lot of _good_ software use it, the
patches to enable it should make damn sure that the upsides actually
outweigh the downsides.

And if the current setup basically is "you have to disable reasonable
SElinux protections that lots of distros use today", I think it's
entirely reasonable saying "the downsides are bigger than the
upsides".

                        Linus