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Message-ID: <84ed0a4b-b1e5-ae86-56c1-40a212734667@linux.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 18:25:45 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...roid.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kbuild mailing list <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to
Kconfig.hardening
On 23.04.2019 22:49, Kees Cook wrote:
> This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory
> initialization menu.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Hello Kees,
I see the changes in STACKLEAK help, looks good to me.
For this patch -
Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
By the way, for your information, GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK help is now unreachable
from 'make menuconfig'.
Best regards,
Alexander
> ---
> scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 51 ---------------------------------
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> index 352f03878a1e..80220ed26a35 100644
> --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
> @@ -108,57 +108,6 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
> in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
> at the cost of weakened randomization.
>
> -config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> - bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
> - depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> - depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
> - help
> - This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
> - returning from system calls. That reduces the information which
> - kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized
> - stack variable attacks.
> -
> - The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
> - compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
> - and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
> - before deploying it.
> -
> - This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
> - * https://grsecurity.net/
> - * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
> -
> -config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
> - int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
> - default 100
> - range 0 4096
> - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> - help
> - The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
> - the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
> - It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
> - a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
> - If unsure, leave the default value 100.
> -
> -config STACKLEAK_METRICS
> - bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
> - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> - depends on PROC_FS
> - help
> - If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
> - the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
> - shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
> - previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
> - can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
> - your workloads.
> -
> -config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
> - bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
> - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> - help
> - This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
> - runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
> - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
> -
> config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
> bool
> depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 19881341f1c2..a96d4a43ca65 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -88,6 +88,63 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
> initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
> by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
>
> +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> + bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGINS
> + depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
> + help
> + This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
> + returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
> + the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
> + the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
> + potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
> + exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
> + depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
> + most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
> + impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
> + the function calling complexity.
> +
> + The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
> + sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
> + are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
> + deploying it.
> +
> + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
> + * https://grsecurity.net/
> + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
> +
> +config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
> + int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
> + default 100
> + range 0 4096
> + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> + help
> + The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
> + the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
> + It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
> + a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
> + If unsure, leave the default value 100.
> +
> +config STACKLEAK_METRICS
> + bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> + depends on PROC_FS
> + help
> + If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
> + the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
> + shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
> + previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
> + can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
> + your workloads.
> +
> +config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
> + bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
> + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> + help
> + This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
> + runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
> + CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
> +
> endmenu
>
> endmenu
>
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