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Message-Id: <20190424170925.112729845@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 19:08:59 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 5.0 003/115] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
[ Upstream commit 899537b73557aafbdd11050b501cf54b4f5c45af ]
arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/atm/lec.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -710,7 +710,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc
static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
{
- if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
+ if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+ if (!dev_lec[arg])
return -EINVAL;
vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
@@ -728,6 +731,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *v
i = arg;
if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
return -EINVAL;
+ i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
if (!dev_lec[i]) {
int size;
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