linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE

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Message-ID: <a136f78e-e9b2-0203-4b4f-84c5db8ccd55@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:11:54 +0000
From:   "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>
To:     "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     "qemu-devel@...gnu.org" <qemu-devel@...gnu.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/10] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command

On 4/24/19 11:10 AM, Singh, Brijesh wrote:
> The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest
> ready for the execution.
> 
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
>  .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst     |  8 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index b9c3dc02f344..72c45f93abd7 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -346,6 +346,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>                  __u32 trans_len;
>          };
>  
> +15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH
> +------------------------
> +
> +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be
> +issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for the execution.

for execution.

Thanks,
Tom

> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
>  References
>  ==========
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index c81cac09c5af..74b57ab742ad 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -7350,6 +7350,26 @@ static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +	struct sev_data_receive_finish *data;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +		return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!data)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	data->handle = sev->handle;
> +	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
> +
> +	kfree(data);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  {
>  	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> @@ -7406,6 +7426,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
>  		r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>  		break;
> +	case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
> +		r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> +		break;
>  	default:
>  		r = -EINVAL;
>  		goto out;
>