linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16 187/202] Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf

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Message-ID: <lsq.1556377989.890181521@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Sat, 27 Apr 2019 16:13:09 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
        "Johan Hedberg" <johan.hedberg@...el.com>,
        "Marcel Holtmann" <marcel@...tmann.org>,
        "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 187/202] Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt
 provides large enough buffer

3.16.66-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>

commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 upstream.

The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.

To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not
below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will
end with the length value being zero after the last option has been
parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the
length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort
and ignore the option.

In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will
be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also
the option parameter size checks.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3322,6 +3322,8 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l

 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&req, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;

 		hint  = type & L2CAP_CONF_HINT;
 		type &= L2CAP_CONF_MASK;
@@ -3533,6 +3535,8 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l

 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;

 		switch (type) {
 		case L2CAP_CONF_MTU:
@@ -3713,6 +3717,8 @@ static void l2cap_conf_rfc_get(struct l2

 	while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) {
 		len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val);
+		if (len < 0)
+			break;

 		switch (type) {
 		case L2CAP_CONF_RFC: