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Message-Id: <1556815969.4134.79.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 02 May 2019 12:52:49 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-secuirty-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: ebiederm@...ssion.com, vgoyal@...hat.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check
On Mon, 2019-04-29 at 14:47 -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
> From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>
>
> added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check
Casey just responded, "I can imagine an LSM that cares about the
command line, but I don't have interest in it for any work I have in
progress." Unless one of the other LSM maintainers is interested,
let's leave it as an IMA only hook.
Mimi
>
> Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
> include/linux/security.h | 3 +++
> kernel/kexec_internal.h | 4 +++-
> security/security.c | 6 ++++++
> 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index a240a3fc5fc4..f18562c1eb24 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1672,6 +1672,8 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
>
> + int (*buffer_check)(const void *buff, int size, const char *eventname);
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1945,6 +1947,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
> struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
> struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx;
> + struct hlist_head buffer_check;
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect;
> struct hlist_head unix_may_send;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 49f2685324b0..8dece6da0dda 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> @@ -1188,6 +1189,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> +static inline void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
> +{ }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_internal.h b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
> index 48aaf2ac0d0d..9f967fbb5aa0 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_internal.h
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
> @@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_segment *segment);
> void kimage_terminate(struct kimage *image);
> int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
> -
> +int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
> + const char *cmdline_ptr,
> + unsigned long cmdline_len);
> extern struct mutex kexec_mutex;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 23cbb1a295a3..2b575a40470e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -754,6 +754,12 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
> }
>
> +void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(buffer_check, buff, size, eventname);
> + return ima_buffer_check(buff, size, eventname);
> +}
> +
> void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
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