linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 05/32] s390: limit brk randomization to 32MB

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Message-Id: <20190502143317.201689230@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu,  2 May 2019 17:20:51 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Stefan Liebler <stli@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
        "Sasha Levin (Microsoft)" <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 05/32] s390: limit brk randomization to 32MB

[ Upstream commit cd479eccd2e057116d504852814402a1e68ead80 ]

For a 64-bit process the randomization of the program break is quite
large with 1GB. That is as big as the randomization of the anonymous
mapping base, for a test case started with '/lib/ld64.so.1 <exec>'
it can happen that the heap is placed after the stack. To avoid
this limit the program break randomization to 32MB for 64-bit and
keep 8MB for 31-bit.

Reported-by: Stefan Liebler <stli@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h
index 8d665f1b29f8..f0fe566a9910 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -215,11 +215,14 @@ do {								\
 
 /*
  * Cache aliasing on the latest machines calls for a mapping granularity
- * of 512KB. For 64-bit processes use a 512KB alignment and a randomization
- * of up to 1GB. For 31-bit processes the virtual address space is limited,
- * use no alignment and limit the randomization to 8MB.
+ * of 512KB for the anonymous mapping base. For 64-bit processes use a
+ * 512KB alignment and a randomization of up to 1GB. For 31-bit processes
+ * the virtual address space is limited, use no alignment and limit the
+ * randomization to 8MB.
+ * For the additional randomization of the program break use 32MB for
+ * 64-bit and 8MB for 31-bit.
  */
-#define BRK_RND_MASK	(is_compat_task() ? 0x7ffUL : 0x3ffffUL)
+#define BRK_RND_MASK	(is_compat_task() ? 0x7ffUL : 0x1fffUL)
 #define MMAP_RND_MASK	(is_compat_task() ? 0x7ffUL : 0x3ff80UL)
 #define MMAP_ALIGN_MASK	(is_compat_task() ? 0 : 0x7fUL)
 #define STACK_RND_MASK	MMAP_RND_MASK
-- 
2.19.1