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Message-ID: <20190504162633.ldrz2nqfocg55grb@localhost>
Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 18:26:33 +0200
From: Victor Bravo <1905@...blk.com>
To: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@...adcom.com>,
Franky Lin <franky.lin@...adcom.com>,
Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@...adcom.com>,
Chi-Hsien Lin <chi-hsien.lin@...ress.com>,
Wright Feng <wright.feng@...ress.com>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
brcm80211-dev-list.pdl@...adcom.com,
brcm80211-dev-list@...ress.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: PROBLEM: brcmfmac's DMI-based fw file names break built-in fw loader
The brcmfmac driver seems to have partially fixed problems which
prevented it to be used in shared system/kernel images for multiple
hardware by trying to load it's <config>.txt as
<config>.<dmi_sys_vendor>.<dmi_product_name>.txt first and then
falling back to <config>.txt. Real-life example:
brcmfmac mmc1:0001:1: Direct firmware load for brcm/brcmfmac43340-sdio.ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.-T100HAN.txt failed with
error -2
brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac43340-sdio for chip
BCM43340/2
Unfortunately this doesn't really help on systems which use static
kernel with firmware blobs (and also text configuration files in case of
brcmfmac) built-in using CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE, as CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE
doesn't support spaces in file names - kernel build fails with
CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE="brcm/brcmfmac43340-sdio.bin brcm/brcmfmac43340-sdio.ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.-T100HAN.txt"
for obvious reasons. So the only way here is to stay with good old
brcmfmac43340-sdio.txt and support at most one brcmfmac-equipped machine
per kernel image.
Please consider filtering the DMI strings and replacing spaces and
possibly other invalid characters with underscores, and/or adding module
parameter to allow passing the string from command line (using
brcmfmac.tag=t100 or brcmfmac.board=t100 to make the module load
brcmfmac43340-sdio.t100.txt seems nicer to me, and isn't prone to
breaking when DMI strings change on BIOS update).
My brief grep-based research also suggest that strings retrieved
by dmi_get_system_info() are passed to firmware loader without any
checks for special character, /../ etc. I'm not sure whether this is
considered to be proper & safe use, but if it's not, it may also have
some security implications, as it allows attacker with access to DMI
strings (using root rights/other OS/BIOS/physical access) to mess
with kernel space or secure boot.
I would also really appreciate not allowing future brcm (and other)
drivers to leave staging area before they fully support =y.
Regards,
v.b.
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