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Message-Id: <20190508144422.13171-25-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:43:44 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload
From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>
It is a requirement of the Kernel Keys subsystem to provide a
preparse method that validates payloads before key instantiate
methods are called.
Verify that userspace provides valid MKTME options and prepare
the payload for use at key instantiate time.
Create a method to free the preparsed payload. The Kernel Key
subsystem will that to clean up after the key is instantiated.
Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/keys/mktme-type.h | 39 +++++++++
security/keys/mktme_keys.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 204 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/keys/mktme-type.h
diff --git a/include/keys/mktme-type.h b/include/keys/mktme-type.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..032905b288b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/mktme-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/* Key service for Multi-KEY Total Memory Encryption */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
+/*
+ * The AES-XTS 128 encryption algorithm requires 128 bits for each
+ * user supplied data key and tweak key.
+ */
+#define MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE 16 /* 16 bytes, 128 bits */
+
+enum mktme_alg {
+ MKTME_ALG_AES_XTS_128,
+};
+
+const char *const mktme_alg_names[] = {
+ [MKTME_ALG_AES_XTS_128] = "aes-xts-128",
+};
+
+enum mktme_type {
+ MKTME_TYPE_ERROR = -1,
+ MKTME_TYPE_USER,
+ MKTME_TYPE_CPU,
+ MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT,
+};
+
+const char *const mktme_type_names[] = {
+ [MKTME_TYPE_USER] = "user",
+ [MKTME_TYPE_CPU] = "cpu",
+ [MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT] = "no-encrypt",
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_mktme;
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
index b5e8289f041b..92a047caa829 100644
--- a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pconfig.h>
+#include <keys/mktme-type.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -69,8 +73,169 @@ int mktme_keyid_from_key(struct key *key)
return 0;
}
+enum mktme_opt_id {
+ OPT_ERROR,
+ OPT_TYPE,
+ OPT_KEY,
+ OPT_TWEAK,
+ OPT_ALGORITHM,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t mktme_token = {
+ {OPT_TYPE, "type=%s"},
+ {OPT_KEY, "key=%s"},
+ {OPT_TWEAK, "tweak=%s"},
+ {OPT_ALGORITHM, "algorithm=%s"},
+ {OPT_ERROR, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mktme_payload {
+ u32 keyid_ctrl; /* Command & Encryption Algorithm */
+ u8 data_key[MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE];
+ u8 tweak_key[MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* Make sure arguments are correct for the TYPE of key requested */
+static int mktme_check_options(struct mktme_payload *payload,
+ unsigned long token_mask, enum mktme_type type)
+{
+ if (!token_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case MKTME_TYPE_USER:
+ if (test_bit(OPT_ALGORITHM, &token_mask))
+ payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_AES_XTS_128;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((test_bit(OPT_KEY, &token_mask)) &&
+ (test_bit(OPT_TWEAK, &token_mask)))
+ payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_DIRECT;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case MKTME_TYPE_CPU:
+ if (test_bit(OPT_ALGORITHM, &token_mask))
+ payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_AES_XTS_128;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_RANDOM;
+ break;
+
+ case MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT:
+ payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_NO_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse the options and store the key programming data in the payload. */
+static int mktme_get_options(char *options, struct mktme_payload *payload)
+{
+ enum mktme_type type = MKTME_TYPE_ERROR;
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+ char *p = options;
+ int ret, token;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&options, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, mktme_token, args);
+ if (token == OPT_ERROR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case OPT_KEY:
+ ret = hex2bin(payload->data_key, args[0].from,
+ MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_TWEAK:
+ ret = hex2bin(payload->tweak_key, args[0].from,
+ MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_TYPE:
+ type = match_string(mktme_type_names,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_type_names),
+ args[0].from);
+ if (type < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ case OPT_ALGORITHM:
+ ret = match_string(mktme_alg_names,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_alg_names),
+ args[0].from);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return mktme_check_options(payload, token_mask, type);
+}
+
+void mktme_free_preparsed_payload(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key Service Method to preparse a payload before a key is created.
+ * Check permissions and the options. Load the proposed key field
+ * data into the payload for use by the instantiate method.
+ */
+int mktme_preparse_payload(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct mktme_payload *mktme_payload;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ char *options;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 || !prep->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ options = kmemdup_nul(prep->data, datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!options)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ mktme_payload = kzalloc(sizeof(*mktme_payload), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mktme_payload) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = mktme_get_options(options, mktme_payload);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kzfree(mktme_payload);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ prep->quotalen = sizeof(mktme_payload);
+ prep->payload.data[0] = mktme_payload;
+out:
+ kzfree(options);
+ return ret;
+}
+
struct key_type key_type_mktme = {
.name = "mktme",
+ .preparse = mktme_preparse_payload,
+ .free_preparse = mktme_free_preparsed_payload,
.describe = user_describe,
};
--
2.20.1
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