linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] netfilter: xt_owner: Add supplementary groups option

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Message-ID: <6a6e9754-4f2b-3433-6df0-bbb9d9915582@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 8 May 2019 08:41:13 -0700
From:   Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To:     Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...sung.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
        Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
        Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...ckhole.kfki.hu>,
        Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Lukasz Pawelczyk <havner@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] netfilter: xt_owner: Add supplementary groups option



On 5/8/19 11:25 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-05-08 at 07:58 -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>
>> On 5/8/19 10:12 AM, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote:
>>> The XT_SUPPL_GROUPS flag causes GIDs specified with XT_OWNER_GID to
>>> be also checked in the supplementary groups of a process.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@...sung.com>
>>> ---
>>>  include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_owner.h |  1 +
>>>  net/netfilter/xt_owner.c                | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>>> --
>>>  2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_owner.h
>>> b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_owner.h
>>> index fa3ad84957d5..d646f0dc3466 100644
>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_owner.h
>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_owner.h
>>> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ enum {
>>>  	XT_OWNER_UID    = 1 << 0,
>>>  	XT_OWNER_GID    = 1 << 1,
>>>  	XT_OWNER_SOCKET = 1 << 2,
>>> +	XT_SUPPL_GROUPS = 1 << 3,
>>>  };
>>>  
>>>  struct xt_owner_match_info {
>>> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c b/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
>>> index 46686fb73784..283a1fb5cc52 100644
>>> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
>>> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_owner.c
>>> @@ -91,11 +91,28 @@ owner_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct
>>> xt_action_param *par)
>>>  	}
>>>  
>>>  	if (info->match & XT_OWNER_GID) {
>>> +		unsigned int i, match = false;
>>>  		kgid_t gid_min = make_kgid(net->user_ns, info-
>>>> gid_min);
>>>  		kgid_t gid_max = make_kgid(net->user_ns, info-
>>>> gid_max);
>>> -		if ((gid_gte(filp->f_cred->fsgid, gid_min) &&
>>> -		     gid_lte(filp->f_cred->fsgid, gid_max)) ^
>>> -		    !(info->invert & XT_OWNER_GID))
>>> +		struct group_info *gi = filp->f_cred->group_info;
>>> +
>>> +		if (gid_gte(filp->f_cred->fsgid, gid_min) &&
>>> +		    gid_lte(filp->f_cred->fsgid, gid_max))
>>> +			match = true;
>>> +
>>> +		if (!match && (info->match & XT_SUPPL_GROUPS) && gi) {
>>> +			for (i = 0; i < gi->ngroups; ++i) {
>>> +				kgid_t group = gi->gid[i];
>>> +
>>> +				if (gid_gte(group, gid_min) &&
>>> +				    gid_lte(group, gid_max)) {
>>> +					match = true;
>>> +					break;
>>> +				}
>>> +			}
>>> +		}
>>> +
>>> +		if (match ^ !(info->invert & XT_OWNER_GID))
>>>  			return false;
>>>  	}
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> How can this be safe on SMP ?
>>
> 
> From what I see after the group_info rework some time ago this struct
> is never modified. It's replaced. Would get_group_info/put_group_info
> around the code be enough?

What prevents the data to be freed right after you fetch filp->f_cred->group_info ?