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Message-ID: <lsq.1557410897.703932534@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 09 May 2019 15:08:17 +0100
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
"Tom Gundersen" <teg@...m.no>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@...gle.com>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"David Herrmann" <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 08/10] fork: record start_time late
3.16.67-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.
This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after
initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new
process visible to user-space.
Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But
this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before
a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with
userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2)
for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network
access, or similar).
By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in
time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other
processes.
Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control
the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a
process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated,
but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on
cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process
that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before.
This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes
by their pid+start_time combination.
Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is
flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based
identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help
mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to
control the start_time a process gets assigned.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: start_time initialisation code is different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
kernel/fork.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1265,9 +1265,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
- do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
- p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
- monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
@@ -1423,6 +1420,18 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
p->task_works = NULL;
/*
+ * From this point on we must avoid any synchronous user-space
+ * communication until we take the tasklist-lock. In particular, we do
+ * not want user-space to be able to predict the process start-time by
+ * stalling fork(2) after we recorded the start_time but before it is
+ * visible to the system.
+ */
+
+ do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
+ p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
+ monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
+
+ /*
* Make it visible to the rest of the system, but dont wake it up yet.
* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling!
*/
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