lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Sun, 12 May 2019 10:02:45 +0200
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
        "ebiggers@...gle.com" <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "jpoimboe@...hat.com" <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "jannh@...gle.com" <jannh@...gle.com>,
        "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@...el.com>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall


* Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:

> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 03:45:19PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > ISTM maybe a better first step would be to make get_random_bytes() be
> > much faster? :)
> 
> I'm not opposed to that, but I want to make sure we don't break it for
> "real" crypto uses...

I'm quite sure Andy implied that.

> I still think just using something very simply like rdtsc would be good 
> enough.
>
> This isn't meant to be a perfect defense: it's meant to disrupt the 
> ability to trivially predict (usually another thread's) stack offset. 

But aren't most local kernel exploit attacks against the current task? 
Are there any statistics about this?

> And any sufficiently well-positioned local attacker can defeat this no 
> matter what the entropy source, given how small the number of bits 
> actually ends up being, assuming they can just keep launching whatever 
> they're trying to attack. (They can just hold still and try the same 
> offset until the randomness aligns: but that comes back to us also 
> needing a brute-force exec deterance, which is a separate subject...)
> 
> The entropy source bikeshedding doesn't seem helpful given how few bits 
> we're dealing with.

The low number of bits is still useful in terms of increasing the 
probability of crashing the system if the attacker cannot guess the stack 
offset.

With 5 bits there's a ~96.9% chance of crashing the system in an attempt, 
the exploit cannot be used for a range of attacks, including spear 
attacks and fast-spreading worms, right? A crashed and inaccessible 
system also increases the odds of leaving around unfinished attack code 
and leaking a zero-day attack.

Thanks,

	Ingo

Powered by blists - more mailing lists