linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk

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Message-ID: <0D08BE40-475A-47AB-A3CE-B8EC4C4357D9@zytor.com>
Date:   Sun, 12 May 2019 17:23:16 -0700
From:   hpa@...or.com
To:     Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
CC:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, initramfs@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com,
        takondra@...co.com, kamensky@...co.com, arnd@...db.de,
        rob@...dley.net, james.w.mcmechan@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk

On May 12, 2019 8:31:05 AM PDT, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 03:18:16AM -0700, hpa@...or.com wrote:
>> > Couldn't this parsing of the .xattr-list file and the setting of
>the xattrs
>> > be done equivalently by the initramfs' /init? Why is kernel
>involvement
>> > actually required here?
>> 
>> There are a lot of things that could/should be done that way...
>
>Indeed... so why not try to avoid adding more such "things", and
>keeping
>them in userspace (or in a fork_usermode_blob)?
>
>
>On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 08:52:47AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> It's too late.  The /init itself should be signed and verified.
>
>Could you elaborate a bit more about the threat model, and why
>deferring
>this to the initramfs is too late?
>
>Thanks,
>	Dominik

I tried over 10 years ago to make exactly that happen... it was called the klibc project. Linus turned it down because he felt that it didn't provide enough immediate benefit to justify the complexity, which of course creates the thousand-cuts problem: there will never be *one single* event that *by itself* justifies the transition.
-- 
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.