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Message-Id: <20190515090730.644770059@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 12:55:33 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>,
Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 226/266] x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream.
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.
Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@...il.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@...el.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3651,11 +3651,23 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
per thread. The mitigation control state
is inherited on fork.
+ prctl,ibpb
+ - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
seccomp
- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
threads will enable the mitigation unless
they explicitly opt out.
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
the available CPU features and vulnerability.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -245,7 +245,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
};
static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
@@ -260,11 +262,13 @@ static const struct {
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
bool secure;
} v2_user_options[] __initdata = {
- { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
- { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
- { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
- { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
- { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
+ { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false },
+ { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
+ { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false },
};
static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@@ -310,6 +314,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
{
enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
+ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
return;
@@ -317,17 +322,20 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP))
smt_possible = false;
- switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd)) {
+ cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+ switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
goto set_mode;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
else
@@ -339,12 +347,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
- switch (mode) {
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
break;
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
- case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
break;
default:
@@ -352,7 +363,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
}
pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ? "always-on" : "conditional");
+ static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
+ "always-on" : "conditional");
}
/* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */
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