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Message-Id: <20190515090658.323236652@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 12:55:48 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.0 067/137] netfilter: nf_tables: prevent shift wrap in nft_chain_parse_hook()
[ Upstream commit 33d1c018179d0a30c39cc5f1682b77867282694b ]
I believe that "hook->num" can be up to UINT_MAX. Shifting more than
31 bits would is undefined in C but in practice it would lead to shift
wrapping. That would lead to an array overflow in nf_tables_addchain():
ops->hook = hook.type->hooks[ops->hooknum];
Fixes: fe19c04ca137 ("netfilter: nf_tables: remove nhooks field from struct nft_af_info")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index e2aac80f9b7b1..25c2b98b9a960 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ static int nft_chain_parse_hook(struct net *net,
if (IS_ERR(type))
return PTR_ERR(type);
}
- if (!(type->hook_mask & (1 << hook->num)))
+ if (hook->num > NF_MAX_HOOKS || !(type->hook_mask & (1 << hook->num)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (type->type == NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT &&
--
2.20.1
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