linux-kernel - Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)

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Message-ID: <20190517192823.GG15006@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 17 May 2019 12:28:23 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        "selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Dr. Greg" <greg@...ellic.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@...hat.com" <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        "npmccallum@...hat.com" <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 02:05:39PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 5/17/19 1:12 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> >How can that work?  Unless the API changes fairly radically, users
> >fundamentally need to both write and execute the enclave.  Some of it will
> >be written only from already executable pages, and some privilege should be
> >needed to execute any enclave page that was not loaded like this.
> 
> I'm not sure what the API is. Let's say they do something like this:
> 
> fd = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDONLY);
> addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> stuff addr into ioctl args
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioctlargs);
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE, &ioctlargs);
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioctlargs);

That's rougly the flow, except that that all enclaves need to have RW and
X EPC pages.

> The important points are that they do not open /dev/sgx/enclave with write
> access (otherwise they will trigger FILE__WRITE at open time, and later
> encounter FILE__EXECUTE as well during mmap, thereby requiring both to be
> allowed to /dev/sgx/enclave), and that they do not request PROT_WRITE to the
> resulting mapping (otherwise they will trigger FILE__WRITE at mmap time).
> Then only FILE__READ and FILE__EXECUTE are required to /dev/sgx/enclave in
> policy.
> 
> If they switch to an anon inode, then any mmap PROT_EXEC of the opened file
> will trigger an EXECMEM check, at least as currently implemented, as we have
> no useful backing inode information.

Yep, and that's by design in the overall proposal.  The trick is that
ENCLAVE_ADD takes a source VMA and copies the contents *and* the
permissions from the source VMA.  The source VMA points at regular memory
that was mapped and populated using existing mechanisms for loading DSOs.

E.g. at a high level:

source_fd = open("/home/sean/path/to/my/enclave", O_RDONLY);
for_each_chunk {
        <hand waving - mmap()/mprotect() the enclave file into regular memory>
}

enclave_fd = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDWR); /* allocs anon inode */
enclave_addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, enclave_fd, 0);

ioctl(enclave_fd, ENCLAVE_CREATE, {enclave_addr});
for_each_chunk {
        struct sgx_enclave_add ioctlargs = {
                .offset = chunk.offset,
                .source = chunk.addr,
                .size   = chunk.size,
                .type   = chunk.type, /* SGX specific metadata */
        }
        ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_ADD, &ioctlargs); /* modifies enclave's VMAs */
}
ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_INIT, ...);


Userspace never explicitly requests PROT_EXEC on enclave_fd, but SGX also
ensures userspace isn't bypassing LSM policies by virtue of copying the
permissions for EPC VMAs from regular VMAs that have already gone through
LSM checks.