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Message-Id: <1558387143.4039.74.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 17:19:03 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
dmitry.kasatkin@...wei.com, mjg59@...gle.com
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, silviu.vlasceanu@...wei.com,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
On Thu, 2019-05-16 at 18:12 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the
> validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash
> algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not
> EVM_XATTR_HMAC.
>
> Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Thanks!
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index e11564eb645b..82a38e801ee4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
> tfm = &hmac_tfm;
> algo = evm_hmac;
> } else {
> + if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
> algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
> }
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