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Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 11:41:07 +0900
From: Minchan Kim <minchan@...nel.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@...gle.com>,
Brian Geffon <bgeffon@...gle.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 5/7] mm: introduce external memory hinting API
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:18:29AM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote:
> [Cc linux-api]
>
> On Mon 20-05-19 12:52:52, Minchan Kim wrote:
> > There is some usecase that centralized userspace daemon want to give
> > a memory hint like MADV_[COOL|COLD] to other process. Android's
> > ActivityManagerService is one of them.
> >
> > It's similar in spirit to madvise(MADV_WONTNEED), but the information
> > required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the app. Instead,
> > it is known to the centralized userspace daemon(ActivityManagerService),
> > and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without
> > any app involvement.
>
> Could you expand some more about how this all works? How does the
> centralized daemon track respective ranges? How does it synchronize
> against parallel modification of the address space etc.
Currently, we don't track each address ranges because we have two
policies at this moment:
deactive file pages and reclaim anonymous pages of the app.
Since the daemon has a ability to let background apps resume(IOW, process
will be run by the daemon) and both hints are non-disruptive stabilty point
of view, we are okay for the race.
>
> > To solve the issue, this patch introduces new syscall process_madvise(2)
> > which works based on pidfd so it could give a hint to the exeternal
> > process.
> >
> > int process_madvise(int pidfd, void *addr, size_t length, int advise);
>
> OK, this makes some sense from the API point of view. When we have
> discussed that at LSFMM I was contemplating about something like that
> except the fd would be a VMA fd rather than the process. We could extend
> and reuse /proc/<pid>/map_files interface which doesn't support the
> anonymous memory right now.
>
> I am not saying this would be a better interface but I wanted to mention
> it here for a further discussion. One slight advantage would be that
> you know the exact object that you are operating on because you have a
> fd for the VMA and we would have a more straightforward way to reject
> operation if the underlying object has changed (e.g. unmapped and reused
> for a different mapping).
I agree your point. If I didn't miss something, such kinds of vma level
modify notification doesn't work even file mapped vma at this moment.
For anonymous vma, I think we could use userfaultfd, pontentially.
It would be great if someone want to do with disruptive hints like
MADV_DONTNEED.
I'd like to see it further enhancement after landing address range based
operation via limiting hints process_madvise supports to non-disruptive
only(e.g., MADV_[COOL|COLD]) so that we could catch up the usercase/workload
when someone want to extend the API.
>
> > All advises madvise provides can be supported in process_madvise, too.
> > Since it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
> > process(CAP_SYS_PTRACE) or something else(e.g., being the same UID)
> > gives it the right to ptrrace the process could use it successfully.
>
> proc_mem_open model we use for accessing address space via proc sounds
> like a good mode. You are doing something similar.
>
> > Please suggest better idea if you have other idea about the permission.
> >
> > * from v1r1
> > * use ptrace capability - surenb, dancol
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@...nel.org>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
> > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
> > include/linux/proc_fs.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 ++
> > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 2 ++
> > kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
> > kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 +
> > mm/madvise.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 8 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > index 4cd5f982b1e5..5b9dd55d6b57 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > @@ -438,3 +438,4 @@
> > 425 i386 io_uring_setup sys_io_uring_setup __ia32_sys_io_uring_setup
> > 426 i386 io_uring_enter sys_io_uring_enter __ia32_sys_io_uring_enter
> > 427 i386 io_uring_register sys_io_uring_register __ia32_sys_io_uring_register
> > +428 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise __ia32_sys_process_madvise
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > index 64ca0d06259a..0e5ee78161c9 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > @@ -355,6 +355,7 @@
> > 425 common io_uring_setup __x64_sys_io_uring_setup
> > 426 common io_uring_enter __x64_sys_io_uring_enter
> > 427 common io_uring_register __x64_sys_io_uring_register
> > +428 common process_madvise __x64_sys_process_madvise
> >
> > #
> > # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
> > diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > index 52a283ba0465..f8545d7c5218 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> > @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static inline struct pid *tgid_pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file)
> >
> > #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
> >
> > +extern struct pid *pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file);
> > struct net;
> >
> > static inline struct proc_dir_entry *proc_net_mkdir(
> > diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > index e2870fe1be5b..21c6c9a62006 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > @@ -872,6 +872,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munlockall(void);
> > asmlinkage long sys_mincore(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> > unsigned char __user * vec);
> > asmlinkage long sys_madvise(unsigned long start, size_t len, int behavior);
> > +asmlinkage long sys_process_madvise(int pid_fd, unsigned long start,
> > + size_t len, int behavior);
> > asmlinkage long sys_remap_file_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
> > unsigned long prot, unsigned long pgoff,
> > unsigned long flags);
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > index dee7292e1df6..7ee82ce04620 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > @@ -832,6 +832,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_io_uring_setup, sys_io_uring_setup)
> > __SYSCALL(__NR_io_uring_enter, sys_io_uring_enter)
> > #define __NR_io_uring_register 427
> > __SYSCALL(__NR_io_uring_register, sys_io_uring_register)
> > +#define __NR_process_madvise 428
> > +__SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise)
> >
> > #undef __NR_syscalls
> > #define __NR_syscalls 428
> > diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> > index 1c86b78a7597..04e75daab1f8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/signal.c
> > +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> > @@ -3620,7 +3620,7 @@ static int copy_siginfo_from_user_any(kernel_siginfo_t *kinfo, siginfo_t *info)
> > return copy_siginfo_from_user(kinfo, info);
> > }
> >
> > -static struct pid *pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file)
> > +struct pid *pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file)
> > {
> > if (file->f_op == &pidfd_fops)
> > return file->private_data;
> > diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > index 4d9ae5ea6caf..5277421795ab 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ COND_SYSCALL(mlockall);
> > COND_SYSCALL(munlockall);
> > COND_SYSCALL(mincore);
> > COND_SYSCALL(madvise);
> > +COND_SYSCALL(process_madvise);
> > COND_SYSCALL(remap_file_pages);
> > COND_SYSCALL(mbind);
> > COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(mbind);
> > diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
> > index 119e82e1f065..af02aa17e5c1 100644
> > --- a/mm/madvise.c
> > +++ b/mm/madvise.c
> > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> > #include <linux/mman.h>
> > #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > #include <linux/page_idle.h>
> > +#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
> > #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
> > #include <linux/page-isolation.h>
> > @@ -16,6 +17,7 @@
> > #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> > #include <linux/falloc.h>
> > #include <linux/sched.h>
> > +#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
> > #include <linux/ksm.h>
> > #include <linux/fs.h>
> > #include <linux/file.h>
> > @@ -1140,3 +1142,46 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(madvise, unsigned long, start, size_t, len_in, int, behavior)
> > {
> > return madvise_core(current, start, len_in, behavior);
> > }
> > +
> > +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(process_madvise, int, pidfd, unsigned long, start,
> > + size_t, len_in, int, behavior)
> > +{
> > + int ret;
> > + struct fd f;
> > + struct pid *pid;
> > + struct task_struct *tsk;
> > + struct mm_struct *mm;
> > +
> > + f = fdget(pidfd);
> > + if (!f.file)
> > + return -EBADF;
> > +
> > + pid = pidfd_to_pid(f.file);
> > + if (IS_ERR(pid)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(pid);
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + rcu_read_lock();
> > + tsk = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
> > + if (!tsk) {
> > + rcu_read_unlock();
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > + get_task_struct(tsk);
> > + rcu_read_unlock();
> > + mm = mm_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
> > + if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
> > + ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
> > + if (ret == -EACCES)
> > + ret = -EPERM;
> > + goto err;
> > + }
> > + ret = madvise_core(tsk, start, len_in, behavior);
> > + mmput(mm);
> > + put_task_struct(tsk);
> > +err:
> > + fdput(f);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
> >
>
> --
> Michal Hocko
> SUSE Labs
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