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Message-ID: <20190521150006.GJ17978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Tue, 21 May 2019 16:00:06 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To:     Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, jannh@...gle.com, fweimer@...hat.com,
        oleg@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        arnd@...db.de, shuah@...nel.org, dhowells@...hat.com,
        tkjos@...roid.com, ldv@...linux.org, miklos@...redi.hu,
        linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org, linux-m68k@...ts.linux-m68k.org,
        linux-mips@...r.kernel.org, linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-sh@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-xtensa@...ux-xtensa.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] open: add close_range()

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 01:34:47PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:

> This adds the close_range() syscall. It allows to efficiently close a range
> of file descriptors up to all file descriptors of a calling task.
> 
> The syscall came up in a recent discussion around the new mount API and
> making new file descriptor types cloexec by default. During this
> discussion, Al suggested the close_range() syscall (cf. [1]). Note, a
> syscall in this manner has been requested by various people over time.
> 
> First, it helps to close all file descriptors of an exec()ing task. This
> can be done safely via (quoting Al's example from [1] verbatim):
> 
>         /* that exec is sensitive */
>         unshare(CLONE_FILES);
>         /* we don't want anything past stderr here */
>         close_range(3, ~0U);
>         execve(....);
> 
> The code snippet above is one way of working around the problem that file
> descriptors are not cloexec by default. This is aggravated by the fact that
> we can't just switch them over without massively regressing userspace. For
> a whole class of programs having an in-kernel method of closing all file
> descriptors is very helpful (e.g. demons, service managers, programming
> language standard libraries, container managers etc.).
> (Please note, unshare(CLONE_FILES) should only be needed if the calling
>  task is multi-threaded and shares the file descriptor table with another
>  thread in which case two threads could race with one thread allocating
>  file descriptors and the other one closing them via close_range(). For the
>  general case close_range() before the execve() is sufficient.)
> 
> Second, it allows userspace to avoid implementing closing all file
> descriptors by parsing through /proc/<pid>/fd/* and calling close() on each
> file descriptor. From looking at various large(ish) userspace code bases
> this or similar patterns are very common in:
> - service managers (cf. [4])
> - libcs (cf. [6])
> - container runtimes (cf. [5])
> - programming language runtimes/standard libraries
>   - Python (cf. [2])
>   - Rust (cf. [7], [8])
> As Dmitry pointed out there's even a long-standing glibc bug about missing
> kernel support for this task (cf. [3]).
> In addition, the syscall will also work for tasks that do not have procfs
> mounted and on kernels that do not have procfs support compiled in. In such
> situations the only way to make sure that all file descriptors are closed
> is to call close() on each file descriptor up to UINT_MAX or RLIMIT_NOFILE,
> OPEN_MAX trickery (cf. comment [8] on Rust).
> 
> The performance is striking. For good measure, comparing the following
> simple close_all_fds() userspace implementation that is essentially just
> glibc's version in [6]:
> 
> static int close_all_fds(void)
> {
>         DIR *dir;
>         struct dirent *direntp;
> 
>         dir = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
>         if (!dir)
>                 return -1;
> 
>         while ((direntp = readdir(dir))) {
>                 int fd;
>                 if (strcmp(direntp->d_name, ".") == 0)
>                         continue;
>                 if (strcmp(direntp->d_name, "..") == 0)
>                         continue;
>                 fd = atoi(direntp->d_name);
>                 if (fd == 0 || fd == 1 || fd == 2)
>                         continue;
>                 close(fd);
>         }
> 
>         closedir(dir); /* cannot fail */
>         return 0;
> }
> 
> to close_range() yields:
> 1. closing 4 open files:
>    - close_all_fds(): ~280 us
>    - close_range():    ~24 us
> 
> 2. closing 1000 open files:
>    - close_all_fds(): ~5000 us
>    - close_range():   ~800 us
> 
> close_range() is designed to allow for some flexibility. Specifically, it
> does not simply always close all open file descriptors of a task. Instead,
> callers can specify an upper bound.
> This is e.g. useful for scenarios where specific file descriptors are
> created with well-known numbers that are supposed to be excluded from
> getting closed.
> For extra paranoia close_range() comes with a flags argument. This can e.g.
> be used to implement extension. Once can imagine userspace wanting to stop
> at the first error instead of ignoring errors under certain circumstances.
> There might be other valid ideas in the future. In any case, a flag
> argument doesn't hurt and keeps us on the safe side.
> 
> >From an implementation side this is kept rather dumb. It saw some input
> from David and Jann but all nonsense is obviously my own!
> - Errors to close file descriptors are currently ignored. (Could be changed
>   by setting a flag in the future if needed.)
> - __close_range() is a rather simplistic wrapper around __close_fd().
>   My reasoning behind this is based on the nature of how __close_fd() needs
>   to release an fd. But maybe I misunderstood specifics:
>   We take the files_lock and rcu-dereference the fdtable of the calling
>   task, we find the entry in the fdtable, get the file and need to release
>   files_lock before calling filp_close().
>   In the meantime the fdtable might have been altered so we can't just
>   retake the spinlock and keep the old rcu-reference of the fdtable
>   around. Instead we need to grab a fresh reference to the fdtable.
>   If my reasoning is correct then there's really no point in fancyfying
>   __close_range(): We just need to rcu-dereference the fdtable of the
>   calling task once to cap the max_fd value correctly and then go on
>   calling __close_fd() in a loop.

> +/**
> + * __close_range() - Close all file descriptors in a given range.
> + *
> + * @fd:     starting file descriptor to close
> + * @max_fd: last file descriptor to close
> + *
> + * This closes a range of file descriptors. All file descriptors
> + * from @fd up to and including @max_fd are closed.
> + */
> +int __close_range(struct files_struct *files, unsigned fd, unsigned max_fd)
> +{
> +	unsigned int cur_max;
> +
> +	if (fd > max_fd)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	cur_max = files_fdtable(files)->max_fds;
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	/* cap to last valid index into fdtable */
> +	if (max_fd >= cur_max)
> +		max_fd = cur_max - 1;
> +
> +	while (fd <= max_fd)
> +		__close_fd(files, fd++);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}

Umm...  That's going to be very painful if you dup2() something to MAX_INT and
then run that; roughly 2G iterations of bouncing ->file_lock up and down,
without anything that would yield CPU in process.

If anything, I would suggest something like

	fd = *start_fd;
	grab the lock
        fdt = files_fdtable(files);
more:
	look for the next eviction candidate in ->open_fds, starting at fd
	if there's none up to max_fd
		drop the lock
		return NULL
	*start_fd = fd + 1;
	if the fscker is really opened and not just reserved
		rcu_assign_pointer(fdt->fd[fd], NULL);
		__put_unused_fd(files, fd);
		drop the lock
		return the file we'd got
	if (unlikely(need_resched()))
		drop lock
		cond_resched();
		grab lock
		fdt = files_fdtable(files);
	goto more;

with the main loop being basically
	while ((file = pick_next(files, &start_fd, max_fd)) != NULL)
		filp_close(file, files);


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