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Message-Id: <20190522070101.7636-2-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:00:54 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: pbonzini@...hat.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
mst@...hat.com, rkrcmar@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
yu-cheng.yu@...el.com
Cc: weijiang.yang@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 1/8] KVM: VMX: Define CET VMCS fields and control bits
CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming IntelĀ® processor
family feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks.
It provides the following capabilities to defend
against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:
- Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
A second stack for the program that is used exclusively for
control transfer operations.
- Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
Free branch protection to defend against jump/call oriented
programming.
Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET - MSRs to control the CET settings for user
mode and suervisor mode respectively.
MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP - MSRs to store shadow stack pointers for
CPL-0,1,2,3 levels.
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB - MSR to store base address of shadow stack
pointer table.
Two XSAVES state components are introduced for CET:
IA32_XSS:[bit 11] - bit for save/restor user mode CET states
IA32_XSS:[bit 12] - bit for save/restor supervisor mode CET states.
6 VMCS fields are introduced for CET, {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET is to store
CET settings in supervisor mode. {HOST,GUEST}_SSP is to store shadow
stack pointers in supervisor mode. {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE is to
store base address of shadow stack pointer table.
If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
- HOST_S_CET
- HOST_SSP
- HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
- GUEST_S_CET
- GUEST_SSP
- GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
Apart from VMCS auto-load fields, KVM calls kvm_load_guest_fpu() and
kvm_put_guest_fpu() to save/restore the guest CET MSR states at
VM exit/entry. XSAVES/XRSTORS are executed underneath these functions
if they are supported. The CET xsave area is consolidated with other
XSAVE components in thread_struct.fpu field.
When context switch happens during task switch/interrupt/exception etc.,
Kernel also relies on above functions to switch CET states properly.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 4e4133e86484..d84804c7ddaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000
#define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE 0x10000000
#define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000
#define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE 0x00100000
#define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
@@ -334,6 +336,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS = 0x00006822,
GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP = 0x00006824,
GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006826,
+ GUEST_S_CET = 0x00006828,
+ GUEST_SSP = 0x0000682a,
+ GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x0000682c,
HOST_CR0 = 0x00006c00,
HOST_CR3 = 0x00006c02,
HOST_CR4 = 0x00006c04,
@@ -346,6 +351,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006c12,
HOST_RSP = 0x00006c14,
HOST_RIP = 0x00006c16,
+ HOST_S_CET = 0x00006c18,
+ HOST_SSP = 0x00006c1a,
+ HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x00006c1c
};
/*
--
2.17.2
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