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Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:30:44 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> Cc: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, "selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>, Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>, "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Dr. Greg" <greg@...ellic.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "nhorman@...hat.com" <nhorman@...hat.com>, "npmccallum@...hat.com" <npmccallum@...hat.com>, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>, "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>, "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>, "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>, "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com> Subject: Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support) On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 12:13 PM Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote: > > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 11:34:32AM -0700, Xing, Cedric wrote: > > > From: linux-sgx-owner@...r.kernel.org [mailto:linux-sgx- > > > owner@...r.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Sean Christopherson > > > Sent: Friday, May 24, 2019 10:55 AM > I don't see a fundamental difference between having RWX in an enclave and > RWX in normal memory, either way the process can execute arbitrary code, > i.e. PROCESS__EXECMEM is appropriate. Yes, an enclave will #UD on certain > instructions, but that's easily sidestepped by having a trampoline in the > host (marked RX) and piping arbitrary code into the enclave. Or using > EEXIT to do a bit of ROP. There's a difference, albeit a somewhat weak one, if sigstructs are whitelisted. FILE__EXECMOD on either /dev/sgx/enclave or on the sigstruct is not an entirely crazy way to express this.
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