[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1558702622-15143-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 20:57:02 +0800
From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
To: oleg@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de
Cc: hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
The n in ptrace_get_debugreg() is indirectly controlled by userspace via syscall: ptrace(defined in kernel/ptrace.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The n can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.
Fix this by sanitizing n before using it to index thread->ptrace_bps.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4b8ee05..3f8f158 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -644,7 +645,8 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
unsigned long val = 0;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+ struct perf_event *bp =
+ thread->ptrace_bps[array_index_nospec(n, HBP_NUM)];
if (bp)
val = bp->hw.info.address;
--
2.7.4
Powered by blists - more mailing lists