linux-kernel - [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 27 May 2019 08:57:16 +0800
From:   Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@...il.com>
To:     sathya.prakash@...adcom.com, chaitra.basappa@...adcom.com,
        suganath-prabu.subramani@...adcom.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        martin.petersen@...cle.com
Cc:     MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@...adcom.com, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main()

In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from 
userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result 
is saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is
fetched again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called,
'ioc' and 'karg' as inputs.

However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two 
fetches, which will cause a potential security issues.  Moreover, a 
malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in 
first fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch.

To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch.

Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@...il.com>
---
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
index b2bb47c..5181c03 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c
@@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg,
 			break;
 		}

+		if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) {
 			uarg = arg;
 			ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf);