linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v15 00/17] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel

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Message-ID: <20190528170244.GF32006@arrakis.emea.arm.com>
Date:   Tue, 28 May 2019 18:02:45 +0100
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     enh <enh@...gle.com>, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        amd-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org,
        linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, linux-media@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        "open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK" 
        <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Yishai Hadas <yishaih@...lanox.com>,
        Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@....com>,
        Alexander Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@....com>,
        Christian Koenig <Christian.Koenig@....com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>,
        Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
        Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@....com>,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@....com>,
        Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@....com>,
        Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@....com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@...il.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 00/17] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel

On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 02:31:16PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> syzkaller already attempts to randomly inject non-canonical and
> 0xFFFF....FFFF addresses for user pointers in syscalls in an effort to
> find bugs like CVE-2017-5123 where waitid() via unchecked put_user() was
> able to write directly to kernel memory[1].
> 
> It seems that using TBI by default and not allowing a switch back to
> "normal" ABI without a reboot actually means that userspace cannot inject
> kernel pointers into syscalls any more, since they'll get universally
> stripped now. Is my understanding correct, here? i.e. exploiting
> CVE-2017-5123 would be impossible under TBI?
> 
> If so, then I think we should commit to the TBI ABI and have a boot
> flag to disable it, but NOT have a process flag, as that would allow
> attackers to bypass the masking. The only flag should be "TBI or MTE".
> 
> If so, can I get top byte masking for other architectures too? Like,
> just to strip high bits off userspace addresses? ;)

Just for fun, hack/attempt at your idea which should not interfere with
TBI. Only briefly tested on arm64 (and the s390 __TYPE_IS_PTR macro is
pretty weird ;)):

--------------------------8<---------------------------------
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
index 63b46e30b2c3..338455a74eff 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/compat.h
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@
 
 #include <asm-generic/compat.h>
 
-#define __TYPE_IS_PTR(t) (!__builtin_types_compatible_p( \
-				typeof(0?(__force t)0:0ULL), u64))
-
 #define __SC_DELOUSE(t,v) ({ \
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(t) > 4 && !__TYPE_IS_PTR(t)); \
 	(__force t)(__TYPE_IS_PTR(t) ? ((v) & 0x7fffffff) : (v)); \
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index e2870fe1be5b..b1b9fe8502da 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -119,8 +119,15 @@ struct io_uring_params;
 #define __TYPE_IS_L(t)	(__TYPE_AS(t, 0L))
 #define __TYPE_IS_UL(t)	(__TYPE_AS(t, 0UL))
 #define __TYPE_IS_LL(t) (__TYPE_AS(t, 0LL) || __TYPE_AS(t, 0ULL))
+#define __TYPE_IS_PTR(t) (!__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(0 ? (__force t)0 : 0ULL), u64))
 #define __SC_LONG(t, a) __typeof(__builtin_choose_expr(__TYPE_IS_LL(t), 0LL, 0L)) a
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define __SC_CAST(t, a)	(__TYPE_IS_PTR(t) \
+				? (__force t) ((__u64)a & ~(1UL << 55)) \
+				: (__force t) a)
+#else
 #define __SC_CAST(t, a)	(__force t) a
+#endif
 #define __SC_ARGS(t, a)	a
 #define __SC_TEST(t, a) (void)BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(!__TYPE_IS_LL(t) && sizeof(t) > sizeof(long))
 

-- 
Catalin