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Message-ID: <CAG48ez3S1c_cd8RNSb9TrF66d+1AMAxD4zh-kixQ6uSEnmS-tg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 29 May 2019 19:38:46 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:     "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()

On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 6:21 PM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 05/29, Jann Horn wrote:
> > (I have no clue whatsoever what the relevant tree for this is, but I
> > guess Oleg is the relevant maintainer?)
>
> we usually route ptrace changes via -mm tree, plus I lost my account on korg.
>
> > --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> > @@ -324,6 +324,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> >       return -EPERM;
> >  ok:
> >       rcu_read_unlock();
> > +     /*
> > +      * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable (through a syscall
> > +      * like setresuid()) while we are trying to access it, we must ensure
> > +      * that the dumpability is read after the credentials; otherwise,
> > +      * we may be able to attach to a task that we shouldn't be able to
> > +      * attach to (as if the task had dropped privileges without becoming
> > +      * nondumpable).
> > +      * Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
> > +      */
> > +     smp_rmb();
>
> (I am wondering if smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() could be used instead, just to
>  make this code look more confusing)

Uuh, I had no idea that that barrier type exists. The helper isn't
even explicitly mentioned in Documentation/memory-barriers.rst. I
don't really want to use dark magic in the middle of ptrace access
logic...

Anyway, looking at it, I think smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() doesn't
make sense here; quoting the documentation: "A load-load control
dependency requires a full read memory barrier, not simply a data
dependency barrier to make it work correctly". IIUC
smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() is for cases in which you would
otherwise need a full memory barrier - smp_mb() - and you want to be
able to reduce it to a read barrier.

> >       mm = task->mm;
>
> while at it, could you also change this into mm = READ_ONCE(task->mm) ?

I'm actually trying to get rid of the ->mm access in
__ptrace_may_access() entirely by moving the dumpability and the
user_ns into the signal_struct, but I don't have patches for that
ready (yet).

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