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Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 18:25:19 +0100 From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> To: keyrings@...r.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>, dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ebiggers@...nel.org Subject: [PATCH 01/10] keys: sparse: Fix key_fs[ug]id_changed() [ver #2] Sparse warnings are incurred by key_fs[ug]id_changed() due to unprotected accesses of tsk->cred, which is marked __rcu. Fix this by passing the new cred struct to these functions from commit_creds() rather than the task pointer. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com> --- include/linux/key.h | 8 ++++---- kernel/cred.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/process_keys.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 7099985e35a9..1f09aad1c98c 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -402,8 +402,8 @@ extern struct ctl_table key_sysctls[]; * the userspace interface */ extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred); -extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk); -extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred); +extern void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred); extern void key_init(void); #else /* CONFIG_KEYS */ @@ -418,8 +418,8 @@ extern void key_init(void); #define make_key_ref(k, p) NULL #define key_ref_to_ptr(k) NULL #define is_key_possessed(k) 0 -#define key_fsuid_changed(t) do { } while(0) -#define key_fsgid_changed(t) do { } while(0) +#define key_fsuid_changed(c) do { } while(0) +#define key_fsgid_changed(c) do { } while(0) #define key_init() do { } while(0) #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 45d77284aed0..3bd40de9e192 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -455,9 +455,9 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) /* alter the thread keyring */ if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) - key_fsuid_changed(task); + key_fsuid_changed(new); if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) - key_fsgid_changed(task); + key_fsgid_changed(new); /* do it * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index f05f7125a7d5..ba5d3172cafe 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -293,28 +293,26 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring) /* * Handle the fsuid changing. */ -void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) +void key_fsuid_changed(struct cred *new_cred) { /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */ - BUG_ON(!tsk->cred); - if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) { - down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); - tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid; - up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); + if (new_cred->thread_keyring) { + down_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem); + new_cred->thread_keyring->uid = new_cred->fsuid; + up_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem); } } /* * Handle the fsgid changing. */ -void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) +void key_fsgid_changed(struct cred *new_cred) { /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */ - BUG_ON(!tsk->cred); - if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) { - down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); - tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid; - up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem); + if (new_cred->thread_keyring) { + down_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem); + new_cred->thread_keyring->gid = new_cred->fsgid; + up_write(&new_cred->thread_keyring->sem); } }
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