linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] epoll: introduce helpers for adding/removing events to uring

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Message-ID: <98e74ceeefdffc9b50fb33e597d270f7@suse.de>
Date:   Fri, 31 May 2019 16:21:30 +0200
From:   Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@...e.de>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     azat@...event.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] epoll: introduce helpers for adding/removing
 events to uring

On 2019-05-31 14:56, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 01:15:21PM +0200, Roman Penyaev wrote:
>> On 2019-05-31 11:56, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 10:58:03AM +0200, Roman Penyaev wrote:
>> > > +static inline bool ep_add_event_to_uring(struct epitem *epi,
>> > > __poll_t pollflags)
>> > > +{
>> > > +	struct eventpoll *ep = epi->ep;
>> > > +	struct epoll_uitem *uitem;
>> > > +	bool added = false;
>> > > +
>> > > +	if (WARN_ON(!pollflags))
>> > > +		return false;
>> > > +
>> > > +	uitem = &ep->user_header->items[epi->bit];
>> > > +	/*
>> > > +	 * Can be represented as:
>> > > +	 *
>> > > +	 *    was_ready = uitem->ready_events;
>> > > +	 *    uitem->ready_events &= ~EPOLLREMOVED;
>> > > +	 *    uitem->ready_events |= pollflags;
>> > > +	 *    if (!was_ready) {
>> > > +	 *         // create index entry
>> > > +	 *    }
>> > > +	 *
>> > > +	 * See the big comment inside ep_remove_user_item(), why it is
>> > > +	 * important to mask EPOLLREMOVED.
>> > > +	 */
>> > > +	if (!atomic_or_with_mask(&uitem->ready_events,
>> > > +				 pollflags, EPOLLREMOVED)) {
>> > > +		unsigned int i, *item_idx, index_mask;
>> > > +
>> > > +		/*
>> > > +		 * Item was not ready before, thus we have to insert
>> > > +		 * new index to the ring.
>> > > +		 */
>> > > +
>> > > +		index_mask = ep_max_index_nr(ep) - 1;
>> > > +		i = __atomic_fetch_add(&ep->user_header->tail, 1,
>> > > +				       __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
>> > > +		item_idx = &ep->user_index[i & index_mask];
>> > > +
>> > > +		/* Signal with a bit, which is > 0 */
>> > > +		*item_idx = epi->bit + 1;
>> >
>> > Did you just increment the user visible tail pointer before you filled
>> > the data? That is, can the concurrent userspace observe the increment
>> > before you put credible data in its place?
>> 
>> No, the "data" is the "ready_events" mask, which was updated before,
>> using cmpxchg, atomic_or_with_mask() call.  All I need is to put an
>> index of just updated item to the uring.
>> 
>> Userspace, in its turn, gets the index from the ring and then checks
>> the mask.
> 
> But where do you write the index into the shared memory? That index
> should be written before you publish the new tail.

The ep_add_event_to_uring() is lockless, thus I can't increase tail 
after,
I need to reserve the index slot, where to write to.  I can use shadow 
tail,
which is not seen by userspace, but I have to guarantee that tail is 
updated
with shadow tail *after* all callers of ep_add_event_to_uring() are 
left.
That is possible, please see the code below, but it adds more 
complexity:

(code was tested on user side, thus has c11 atomics)

static inline void add_event__kernel(struct ring *ring, unsigned bit)
{
         unsigned i, cntr, commit_cntr, *item_idx, tail, old;

         i = __atomic_fetch_add(&ring->cntr, 1, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
         item_idx = &ring->user_itemsindex[i % ring->nr];

         /* Update data */
         *item_idx = bit;

         commit_cntr = __atomic_add_fetch(&ring->commit_cntr, 1, 
__ATOMIC_RELEASE);

         tail = ring->user_header->tail;
         rmb();
         do {
                 cntr = ring->cntr;
                 if (cntr != commit_cntr)
                         /* Someone else will advance tail */
                         break;

                 old = tail;

         } while ((tail = 
__sync_val_compare_and_swap(&ring->user_header->tail, old, cntr)) != 
old);
}

Another way (current solution) is to spin on userspace side in order to 
get
index > 0 (valid index is always > 0), i.e.:

	item_idx_ptr = &index[idx & indeces_mask];

	/*
	 * Spin here till we see valid index
	 */
	while (!(idx = __atomic_load_n(item_idx_ptr, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)))
		;



So of course tail can be updated after, like you mentioned, but then I 
have
to introduce locks.  I want to keep it lockless on hot event path.

--
Roman