linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave

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Message-ID: <d9ef6314-de91-ddcb-3d18-8155cd37e7be@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date:   Mon, 3 Jun 2019 10:19:18 -0400
From:   Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@...el.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        William Roberts <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
        Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for
 Intel SGX

On 5/31/19 7:31 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> enclave_load() is roughly analogous to the existing file_mprotect().
> 
> Due to the nature of SGX and its Enclave Page Cache (EPC), all enclave
> VMAs are backed by a single file, i.e. /dev/sgx/enclave, that must be
> MAP_SHARED.  Furthermore, all enclaves need read, write and execute
> VMAs.  As a result, file_mprotect() does not provide any meaningful
> security for enclaves since an LSM can only deny/grant access to the
> EPC as a whole.
> 
> security_enclave_load() is called when SGX is first loading an enclave
> page, i.e. copying a page from normal memory into the EPC.  The notable
> difference from file_mprotect() is the allowed_prot parameter, which
> is essentially an SGX-specific version of a VMA's MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}
> flags.  The purpose of allowed_prot is to enable checks such as
> SELinux's FILE__EXECMOD permission without having to track and update
> VMAs across multiple mm structs, i.e. SGX can ensure userspace doesn't
> overstep its bounds simply by restricting an enclave VMA's protections
> by vetting what is maximally allowed during build time.
> 
> An alternative to the allowed_prot approach would be to use an enclave's
> SIGSTRUCT (a smallish structure that can uniquely identify an enclave)
> as a proxy for the enclave.  For example, SGX could take and hold a
> reference to the file containing the SIGSTRUCT (if it's in a file) and
> call security_enclave_load() during mprotect().  While the SIGSTRUCT
> approach would provide better precision, the actual value added was
> deemed to be negligible.  On the other hand, pinning a file for the
> lifetime of the enclave is ugly, and essentially caching LSM policies
> in each page's allowed_prot avoids having to make an extra LSM upcall
> during mprotect().
> 
> Note, extensive discussion yielded no sane alternative to some form of
> SGX specific LSM hook[1].
> 
> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrXf8mSK45h7sTK5Wf+pXLVn=Bjsc_RLpgO-h-qdzBRo5Q@mail.gmail.com
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 14 +++++++++-----
>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h              | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>   include/linux/security.h               |  2 ++
>   security/security.c                    |  8 ++++++++
>   4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> index 5f71be7cbb01..260417ecbcff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>   #include <linux/highmem.h>
>   #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
>   #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>   #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/suspend.h>
> @@ -580,21 +581,24 @@ static int sgx_encl_page_protect(unsigned long src, unsigned long prot,
>   				 unsigned long *allowed_prot)
>   {
>   	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> +	int ret = 0;
>   
> -	if (!(*allowed_prot & VM_EXEC))
> +	if (!(*allowed_prot & VM_EXEC) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY))
>   		goto do_check;
>   
>   	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
>   	vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
>   	if (!vma || (vma->vm_file && path_noexec(&vma->vm_file->f_path)))
>   		*allowed_prot &= ~VM_EXEC;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +	ret = security_enclave_load(vma, prot, allowed_prot);
> +#endif

Normally you'd define a static inline stub for the hook in the #else 
clause for CONFIG_SECURITY in include/linux/security.h and avoid any 
ifdef here.

What ensures that the mapping referenced by src can't be changed to an 
entirely different one (with a different vm_file) between the time of 
check (here) and the time of use?

>   	up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
>   
>   do_check:
> -	if (prot & ~*allowed_prot)
> -		return -EACCES;
> -
> -	return 0;
> +	if (!ret && (prot & ~*allowed_prot))
> +		ret = -EACCES;
> +	return ret;
>   }
>   
>   static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@
>    * @bpf_prog_free_security:
>    *	Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
>    *
> + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> + *
> + * @enclave_load:
> + *	On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot
> + *	@vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded.
> + *	@prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.
> + *	@allowed_prot: the maximum protections of the enclave page.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>    */
>   union security_list_options {
>   	int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
> @@ -1807,6 +1815,11 @@ union security_list_options {
>   	int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
>   	void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +	int (*enclave_load)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot,
> +			    unsigned long *allowed_prot);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>   };
>   
>   struct security_hook_heads {
> @@ -2046,6 +2059,9 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
>   	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
>   	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +	struct hlist_head enclave_load;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>   } __randomize_layout;
>   
>   /*
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 659071c2e57c..2f7925eeef7e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
>   int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
>   int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
>   int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot,
> +			  unsigned long *allowed_prot);
>   #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>   
>   static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 613a5c00e602..07ed6763571e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2359,3 +2359,11 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>   	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
>   }
>   #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX
> +int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot,
> +			  unsigned long *allowed_prot)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(enclave_load, 0, vma, prot, allowed_prot);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */
>