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Message-ID: <20190604203649.GC7775@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 13:36:49 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
npmccallum@...hat.com, Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@...el.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook
for Intel SGX
On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:29:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 4:32 PM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote:
> > static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@
> > * @bpf_prog_free_security:
> > * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
> > *
> > + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> > + *
> > + * @enclave_load:
> > + * On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot
> > + * @vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded.
> > + * @prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.
>
> What do you mean "initial"? The page is always mapped PROT_NONE when
> this is called, right? I feel like I must be missing something here.
Initial protection in the EPCM. Yet another reason to ignore SECINFO.
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