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Message-ID: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F654EDB7D@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:43:09 +0000
From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>
To: "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>
CC: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
"selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"nhorman@...hat.com" <nhorman@...hat.com>,
"npmccallum@...hat.com" <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
"Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
"Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@...el.com>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
"Andy Shevchenko" <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
"Tricca, Philip B" <philip.b.tricca@...el.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook
for Intel SGX
> From: Christopherson, Sean J
> Sent: Tuesday, June 04, 2019 1:37 PM
>
> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:29:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 4:32 PM Sean Christopherson
> > <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote:
> > > static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long
> > > addr, diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > @@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@
> > > * @bpf_prog_free_security:
> > > * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
> > > *
> > > + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> > > + *
> > > + * @enclave_load:
> > > + * On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot
> > > + * @vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being
> loaded.
> > > + * @prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.
> >
> > What do you mean "initial"? The page is always mapped PROT_NONE when
> > this is called, right? I feel like I must be missing something here.
>
> Initial protection in the EPCM. Yet another reason to ignore SECINFO.
I know you guys are talking in the background that all pages are mmap()'ed PROT_NONE. But that's an unnecessary limitation. And @prot here should be @target_vma->vm_flags&(VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC).
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