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Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 15:42:06 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
USB list <linux-usb@...r.kernel.org>, raven@...maw.net,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-block@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3]
> On Jun 6, 2019, at 3:38 PM, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>
>> I mean: are there cases where some action generates a notification but does
>> not otherwise have an effect visible to the users who can receive the
>> notification. It looks like the answer is probably “no”, which is good.
>
> mount_notify(). You can get a notification that someone altered the mount
> topology (eg. by mounting something). A process receiving a notification
> could then use fsinfo(), say, to reread the mount topology tree, find out
> where the new mount is and wander over there to have a look - assuming they
> have the permissions for pathwalk to succeed.
>
>
They can call fsinfo() anyway, or just read /proc/self/mounts. As far as I’m concerned, if you have CAP_SYS_ADMIN over a mount namespace and LSM policy lets you mount things, the of course you can get information to basically anyone who can use that mount namespace.
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