linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/cet/ibt: Add IBT legacy code bitmap setup function

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Message-Id: <25281DB3-FCE4-40C2-BADB-B3B05C5F8DD3@amacapital.net>
Date:   Fri, 7 Jun 2019 13:43:15 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 03/14] x86/cet/ibt: Add IBT legacy code bitmap setup function



> On Jun 7, 2019, at 12:49 PM, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, 2019-06-07 at 11:29 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Jun 7, 2019, at 10:59 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 6/7/19 10:43 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>>> I've no idea what the kernel should do; since you failed to answer the
>>>> question what happens when you point this to garbage.
>>>> 
>>>> Does it then fault or what?
>>> 
>>> Yeah, I think you'll fault with a rather mysterious CR2 value since
>>> you'll go look at the instruction that faulted and not see any
>>> references to the CR2 value.
>>> 
>>> I think this new MSR probably needs to get included in oops output when
>>> CET is enabled.
>> 
>> This shouldn’t be able to OOPS because it only happens at CPL 3, right?  We
>> should put it into core dumps, though.
>> 
>>> 
>>> Why don't we require that a VMA be in place for the entire bitmap?
>>> Don't we need a "get" prctl function too in case something like a JIT is
>>> running and needs to find the location of this bitmap to set bits itself?
>>> 
>>> Or, do we just go whole-hog and have the kernel manage the bitmap
>>> itself. Our interface here could be:
>>> 
>>>   prctl(PR_MARK_CODE_AS_LEGACY, start, size);
>>> 
>>> and then have the kernel allocate and set the bitmap for those code
>>> locations.
>> 
>> Given that the format depends on the VA size, this might be a good idea.  I
>> bet we can reuse the special mapping infrastructure for this — the VMA could
>> be a MAP_PRIVATE special mapping named [cet_legacy_bitmap] or similar, and we
>> can even make special rules to core dump it intelligently if needed.  And we
>> can make mremap() on it work correctly if anyone (CRIU?) cares.
>> 
>> Hmm.  Can we be creative and skip populating it with zeros?  The CPU should
>> only ever touch a page if we miss an ENDBR on it, so, in normal operation, we
>> don’t need anything to be there.  We could try to prevent anyone from
>> *reading* it outside of ENDBR tracking if we want to avoid people accidentally
>> wasting lots of memory by forcing it to be fully populated when the read it.
>> 
>> The one downside is this forces it to be per-mm, but that seems like a
>> generally reasonable model anyway.
>> 
>> This also gives us an excellent opportunity to make it read-only as seen from
>> userspace to prevent exploits from just poking it full of ones before
>> redirecting execution.
> 
> GLIBC sets bits only for legacy code, and then makes the bitmap read-only.  That
> avoids most issues:

How does glibc know the linear address space size?  We don’t want LA64 to break old binaries because the address calculation changed.