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Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 17:23:28 -0700
From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com, vgoyal@...hat.com,
Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 1/3] Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args
This patch adds support in ima to measure kexec cmdline args
during soft reboot kexec_file_load.
- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the
kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure
the buffer hash into the ima log.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the
measurement.[Suggested by Mimi]
Hash computation can be tested using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 +
include/linux/ima.h | 2 +
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++
6 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index b383c1763610..fc376a323908 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Description:
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
+ [KEXEC_CMDLINE]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index fd9f7cf4cdf5..b42f5a006042 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
return;
}
+static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 18b48a6d0b80..a4ad1270bffa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
+ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \
hook(MAX_CHECK)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 78eb11c7ac07..ea7d8cbf712f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ * | KEXEC_CMDLINE
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index af341a80118f..e4f301381ffb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -605,6 +605,83 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
+ * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
+ * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation.
+ * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated.
+ *
+ * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
+ */
+static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+ const char *eventname, const struct cred *cred,
+ u32 secid)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = iint};
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
+ struct {
+ struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+ char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ } hash;
+ int violation = 0;
+ int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+ int action = 0;
+
+ action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr,
+ &template_desc);
+ if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
+ goto out;
+
+ memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
+ memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+ event_data.filename = eventname;
+
+ iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
+ iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+ iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+
+ ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint->ima_hash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+ ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+{
+ u32 secid;
+
+ if (buf && size != 0) {
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
+ current_cred(), secid);
+ }
+}
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index fd9b01881d17..98e351e13557 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -292,6 +292,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
{
int i;
+ /* only incase of KEXEC_CMDLINE, inode is NULL */
+ if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) {
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+ (rule->func == func) && (!inode))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+ }
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
(rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
@@ -880,6 +887,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
+ entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
--
2.19.1
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